



The Security Division of EMC

Where Online Fraud Is Going

Emerging Threats & Changing Fraud Patterns

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Things to Ponder.....

- ▶ One identity = new keys to the kingdom?
- ▶ We're combating fraud together!
- ▶ Are you prepared for emerging threats?
- ▶ Thinking beyond web portal "identity"



The Good News....


Federated Identity gives you:

- ☑ Less points to secure and authenticate
- ☑ Centralized identity & audit controls
- ☑ Ability to initially pinpoint fraud up front
- ☑ Less personal data distributed amongst providers




The Bad News...

Just when we thought we figured it out...*it keeps changing!*



Fraudulent Enrollment & Origination

- ▶ Enrolling offline users to online account
 - Long-time customers
 - Most vulnerable
 - Elderly
 - Poor
 - People without Internet access
- ▶ New account fraud
 - Use false/synthetic identities
 - Information does not match real person
 - Created on the spot or developed over years
 - Use well-known sites for identity theft
 - Person assumes identity of real individual (dead or alive)
 - Use as a “mule account”
 - Understand how site security works



Identity thieves in jail

One Identity = One Stop Shopping? *What will be the new "Keys To The Kingdom"?*

- ▶ SSNs – old keys to the kingdom
 - never intended for authentication → used for identity
- ▶ DarkMarket FBI sting shut down notorious Russian Fraudster selling SSN automatic checker
- ▶ Fraudster underground commonly sell SSN – **WHAT NEXT?**

PRIVATE COLLIDER SYSTEM
ONE WAY TO BUY

Regular base last update - 20.01.2009
Fresh base last update - 20.01.2009
Agent base last update - 25.01.2009
Checker [Online](#) Accept [Visa MC Amex Discover](#)

Collider Menu
BUY CC
BUY DUMPS [NEW]
CC Order History
CC Agent Order History
[OPENED] SSN Lookup
FULL CC checking
Batch DUMP/CC Cheking
Checker history
Prices
HELP [Eng/Rus]
RULES [Eng/Rus]
[Logoff]

Balance: [Redacted]

1 check = 20 cr

First Name: [Input]
Last Name: [Input]
Middle Name: [Input]
State: All States [Dropdown]
City: [Input]
Zip: [Input]
Address: [Input]
[Search]

Date IP Link

Contacts [Redacted]

Instant payment
[Redacted] [Pay]

Calculator

1\$ = 5 cr.
Amount of Credits = 125 cr.
Checks: 83 (0.30\$)
SSN: 6 (4.17\$)

Our prices

Random CC: 25 (1.00\$)
By bin CC: 5 (5.00\$)
By Zip/st CC: 8 (3.13\$)
Eu CC: 5 (5.00\$)
Fresh CC: 12 (2.08\$)

Our agent prices

Random CC: 31 (0.81\$)
By bin CC: 12 (2.08\$)
By Zip/st CC: 25 (1.00\$)
Eu CC: 6 (4.17\$)

Emerging Authentication & Authorization Threats?

- ▶ Phishing
- ▶ Malware
 - Trojans
 - Man-in-the-browser (MITB)
- ▶ Distribution Tools



Dear valued customer of TrustedBank,

We have received notice that you have recently attempted to withdraw the following amount from your checking account while in another country: \$135.25.

If this information is not correct, someone unknown may have access to your account. As a safety measure, please visit our website via the link below to verify your personal information:

<http://www.trustedbank.com/general/custverifyinfo.asp>


Once you have done this, our fraud department will work to resolve this discrepancy. We are happy you have chosen us to do business with.

Thank you,
TrustedBank


Member FDIC © 2005 TrustedBank, Inc.




Phishing: Diversifying Targets



Blend of Phishing and Crimeware




A Basic Trojan Attack



Sinowal Trojan

- ▶ Over 500,000 Compromised Credentials since 2006
- ▶ More than 2,000 Bank Domains impacted, non-financial institutions impacted as well

Sinowal - Compromised bank accounts



How Is Malware Distributed?

▶ Cease-Fire Trojan Attack

- Social engineering scam designed to lure people, via an email spam attack to fake news website designed to look like CNN.com.
- Near real-time response to breaking news
- Similar to other social engineering attacks

Israel offers short respite from strikes

Israel will halt its bombardment of Gaza for three hours every day to allow residents of the Hamas-ruled Palestinian territory to obtain much-needed supplies, a military spokesman says. The images broadcast here were graphic and striking. The Al Jazeera English report below captures the extent of the devastation caused by the initial strikes.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/meast/01-07.bigvideo.2009.israel.and.gaza/index.html>

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Fraud-as-a-Service

We need to combat fraud together!



Fraud-as-a-Service

Example: Universal MITM Phishing Kit

Genuine domain

- ▶ Universal: Any entity can be readily targeted
- ▶ Sophisticated: Spoofed Domain phishing-based MITM attacks easy to implement
- ▶ Compelling: After unsuspecting user clicks on link, genuine site is referenced via proxy
- ▶ Powerful: Collects *any* credentials
- ▶ Easy, easy, easy

Why my brand? Why mybrand.com

lamathief@fraudster.com
Rollingindough@fraudster.com

[Domains] [Pages] [Visitors]

SSL .com

Send posts to: =>

Send emails «from»: =>

Domain rewriting

=>

=>

Emails

=>

=>

HTML rewriting

From	To	Del
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

Submit

[Domains] [Pages] [Visitors]



Fraud-as-a-Service Crimeware Testing Tools & Warranty

Anti-Virus “tester” and “fixer” with **guaranteed** replacement if detected



Reviewed Vendor (SPYWARE)

Silo Super Trojan

<http://www.../packag...screenshot.JPG>

- File Manager
- Process Manager
- Remote shell
- Http Server
- Http Proxy
- Port redirect
- Information
- Pws (Protected storage)
- Advanced keylogger
- IMS spy
- VNC
- Download/ upload/ Execute
- temp switch/redirect
- 6 months (undetected) support


Price: \$600 USD
Egold/WMZ Only
Escrow Accepted and Encouraged

Combating Fraud End-to-End

Think beyond portal "Identity" - Multiple Attack Vectors & Channels



How Multi-Channel Fraud is Perpetrated



So What Can You Do?

*Victory is not found in destroying the opponent,
it is found in reducing them!*

As with fighting any intelligent opponent, the goal must be...

- ▶ To analyze
- ▶ To act
- ▶ To achieve measurable *reductions* in fraud
- ▶ To adapt
- ▶ To repeat the above



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So What Can You Do?

Layered Defense Strategy

▶ Holistic

- Take proactive countermeasures to stop 'harvesting' fraudsters
- Monitor and detect 'cash-out' fraudsters
- Implement vulnerability & configuration polices – then AUDIT

▶ In-Depth

- Protect enrollment, login, transactions & other post-login activities
- Protect sensitive data, prevent ID theft and account takeover
- Detect early 'signs' and fraud-enabling steps (e.g. profile changes)

▶ Adaptive

- Tune security according to level risk and changing threats
- Balance with cost and usability
- Monitor (invisibly), block, or authenticate (visibly)





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Thank you!