Identification as a National Priority: The Unique Case of Peru

William Reuben and Flávia Carbonari

Abstract

Peru is a remarkable example of a country that established civil identification as a national priority in response to the need to re-integrate the state after a serious insurgency. It has built one of the strongest and most inclusive national ID programs in the world, including for children. The approach has combined the creation of an autonomous civil registration and identification agency and the use of performance-based financing to expand coverage to poor, remote, communities and to help integrate civil registration with the national ID. It offers lessons for many countries struggling to achieve SDG 16.9, to provide legal identity to all by 2030, including birth registration.

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Contents

Preface

Peru offers a remarkable example of a country that established the development of the civil identification system as a national priority. Starting with the creation of the National Civil Registry and Identification Registry of Peru (RENIEC) in 1995, it has built up one of the strongest and most inclusive national civil registration and identification programs in the world, including for children. RENIEC is responsible for both civil registration and ID services. It followed a determined approach to reach out to remote areas and indigenous communities by creating a specific directorate and implementing culturally sensitive methodologies. Its experience offers many lessons for other countries with huge registration gaps and diverse populations seeking to accomplish SDG16.9, to provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.

A distinctive feature of the RENIEC story is the relationship between civil registration and the national ID system. In contrast to most Latin American countries, which started from a centralized civil registry, Peru prioritized identification in response to the need to re-integrate the country after an insurgency that displaced some 600,000 people and destroyed many records, with approximately a total of 3 million citizens reported as not having any type of identification document. Only later were efforts made to incorporate local civil registries, managed by municipalities, into a single national system led by RENIEC, and to integrate this into the identification system. The approach included performance-based transfers to the municipalities to encourage the timely submission of data. It offers insights for the many countries struggling to integrate separate civil registration and ID systems.

Another notable feature of RENIEC is its unique autonomous status—guaranteed by the constitution and independent from any ministry or political body. In line with this status it was also planned to be financially self-supporting, with costs covered by service fees. This "commercial" model is of interest to many countries facing financial constraints but raises the question of how to fund the provision of ID as a social good. RENIEC's own resources later came to be supplemented by performance-based grants from government to cover the cost of extending ID services to poor and remote people as well as to children. But independence appears to have been valuable—national surveys place RENIEC as the most trusted institution in Peru, even ahead of the Catholic Church.

Peru's experience therefore offers useful insights for other countries, including those that start out with severe dislocations due to civil conflict and need to re-build an integrated nation. But it also offers some cautions. Even though it was necessary to prioritize ID in the early stages, the long-delayed attention to strengthening civil registration has prolonged some difficulties and made it harder to maintain an updated database. The requirement that children be registered for services has expanded coverage and strengthened the implementation of conditional transfer programs but it might also have led to a fall in the number of newborns registered into health and nutrition programs. More attention is needed to data privacy and protection; this area has not been a major problem in the past but could assume a higher profile as more electronic data is collected. Finally, loss of financial autonomy—and therefore institutional independence—is also a risk. The financial model will need to adapt in response to lower fees from the issue of IDs since there are now few unregistered people while, at the same time, the unit costs of "last mile" registration are far higher for people in remote and isolated areas.

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List of Acronyms

AFIS	Automatic Fingerprint Identification
ANPDP	Autoridad Nacional para la Protección de Datos Personales (National Authority for Personal Data Protection)
CAER	Centro de Altos Estudios Registrales
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CGD	Center for Global Development
CUI	Código Único de Identificación (Unique Identification Code)
DNI	Documento Nacional de Identidad (National Identity Document)
ENAHO	Encuesta Nacional de Hogares
ENDES	Encuesta Demográfica y de Salud Familiar
ENRECI	Escuela Nacional de Registro del Estado Civil e Identificación
EPP	Encuesta Nacional de Programas Presupuestales
FONCODES	Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social (Fund for Social Development)
FUNDIBEQ	Fundación Iberoamericana para la Gestión de la Calidad
GIZ	German International Cooperation Agency
GRIAS Office	Gerencia para la Restitucion de la Identidad y Asistencia Social (Management for the Restitution of Identity and Social Assistance)
IMC	Infant Chronic Malnutrition
INEI	Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Información
MCLCP	Mesa de Concertación para la Lucha Contra la Pobreza
MEF	Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas (Ministry of Economy and Finance)
MINSA	Ministerio de Salud (Ministry of Health)
MININTER	Ministerio del Interior (Ministry of Interior)
MIMDES	Ministerio de la Mujer y del Desarrollo Social (Ministry for Women and Social Development)
MMM	Marco Macroeconómicos Multinanuales (Macroeconomic multiannual frameworks)

NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority of Pakistan
ORA	Oficinas de Registro Auxiliares (Auxiliary Registry Offices)
ORAF	Provincial, district and *centro poblado* ORECs affiliated and reporting to the Online Registry System
OREC	Oficina de Registro del Estado Civil (Municipal Civil Registry Offices)
PIR	Programa Integral de Reparaciones (Integral Reparations' Program)
RENIEC	Registro Nacional de Identificación y Registro Civil (National Civil Registry and Identification Registry)
RUV	Registro Único de Víctimas (Unique Registry of Victims)
SIS	Sistema Integrado de Salud (Integrated Health Insurance System)
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
UPSA	United Nations Public Service Award

Foreword

The National Civil Registry and Identification Registry of Peru (RENIEC) embodies the country's efforts to make identification a core national priority. As an autonomous entity with a specific assigned budget, RENIEC enjoys a high level of public recognition and acceptance in Peru and is considered a unique and successful institution in Latin America. While, after the republican reforms that resulted in the secularization of church registries, most countries in the region opted for centrally integrating the civil registry system run by the state, and then progressively moved towards de-concentration or decentralization, Peru has followed the opposite path. Under RENIEC, a once decentralized system is now moving towards integration. The prioritization of identification in the national agenda, which emerged initially as a response to the consequences of political violence, has been sustained despite changes in government. A series of national plans and policies committed to the effective and universal provision of identification services for over two decades have helped Peru to achieve high levels of enrollment and ID coverage The provision of a national identity document for children is also an innovative feature of the Peruvian system, created to improve the targeting of social programs. Despite all this progress and innovation, challenges remain. This paper tells the story of Peru's civil registry and identification system, discussing its achievements, challenges, remaining gaps and current efforts to address them while highlighting a number of useful lessons for other countries.

The paper draws on data collected for the World Bank in preparation of the *Peru Country Report*, as part of the Universal Access by 2020 Agenda and the Social Protection Assessments (SPA), an interagency collaboration. The Report was a joint effort by the World Bank and RENIEC, authored by Robert Palacios and William Reuben.

1. Overview

1.1 A Snapshot of Civil Registry Systems in Latin America

Civil registration systems, which contain and manage records of births, deaths and marital status, are crucial databases. They provide basic information about the legal identity of individuals and thus enable the organization of credible and transparent elections, help improve tax collection systems, enhance the reliability of economic and financial transactions, and contribute to the design of effective and targeted public policies and the measurement of their impact.

Civil registration systems represent a valuable tool for building citizenship and social inclusion. Yet, many countries do not have the necessary legal framework or infrastructure to create and maintain a solid civil registry system. Even in developed countries like France and the United Kingdom, it took more than three centuries for civil registration systems to evolve from the ancient church registries to secular and fully reliable state run registries (WHO 2014).[1]

Civil registration in most of Latin America also started with the church, evolving into different models throughout time. Today, there are basically three types of civil registry systems in the region. The decentralized systems are most common in federal countries, such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, where registries are the responsibility of federal states and there are no attempts to integrate them under a federal level agency. This was also the case in Peru until fairly recently, although the decentralization was done at the municipal level. The second model involves systems that are completely centralized at the national level, but with deconcentrated registry offices spread out throughout a country. This is the case in places such as Colombia and Costa Rica. The third model could be defined as a hybrid one, as it consists of a centralized system integrating databases and registries in one single national entity, while maintaining decentralized registries managed by local governments; and deconcentrated offices at the provincial or even hospital levels that report to the centralized, national-level agency. That would be the case of Peru today.

There are also differences in the institutional frameworks of civil registry systems across Latin America. In completely centralized systems, the registry is usually part of the electoral body, which is the case of Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Panamá and Venezuela. Civil registries can also be located within the Ministry of Justice (Brazil, Belize, Chile, Ecuador and Paraguay) or Interior (Guyana and Suriname and Mexico). In Argentina, the system is part of the Provincial Ministry of Government; in Jamaica, the Ministry of Health; and in Uruguay, the Ministry of Education and Culture. Finally, there are countries like El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, where civil registries are autonomous systems (Harbitz et al. 2010). The latter is also the case in Peru, which is unique for a number of other different reasons we will discuss throughout this paper.

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[1] Even France, that as early as in 1792 established the secular registries, followed a long process of legal and administrative reforms to complete the integration of the civil registry information. For instance, it was not until 1954 that the updating of the birth certificate information included critical data as the person's date and place of death and changes in her marital status (Noiriel,1993).

1.2 Background of Peru's Civil Registry and Identification System

To understand the uniqueness of the Peruvian case, it is essential to go back to the origins of its civil registration system. The Incas of Peru (1.200 to 1.527, A.C.) were the first in the Continent to record life events, although neither its fundamental objective nor the methods used are necessarily related to the modern concept of civil registration. The Incas had no written characters, using intertwined colored ribbons and knots to record the facts. These mechanisms known as registration *Quipus* were under the responsibility of *Quipucamayus* who documented through the knots all the taxes that were paid to the Inca each year, identifying each household and the nature of its contribution. They would register the number of people who went to war, those who died in it, and those born and deceased each month (Farfan 2006).

During colonial times, there was no national legislation on the registration of births, deaths and marital status. This work was carried out by the Catholic Church through the parishes, governed by Canon Law. In 1749, the Spanish Crown started to order monthly statements of vital events, charging the same parishes with the care and custody of these books. With the advent of independence and the birth of the republic in 1852, the first Peruvian Civil Code was enacted, creating records of civil status that were then to be managed by district governors.[2]

With the establishment of the Peruvian Constitution in 1856, the provincial and district mayors became responsible for managing and maintaining the civil registry books. The objective of establishing identification records was an electoral one. Local civil registries enabled the government to know the number of citizens in each jurisdiction and to issue an identification card known as the Electoral Card (*Libreta Electoral*) to those eligible to vote.[3]

More than a century later in 1995, the National Identification and Civil Registry of Peru *(Registro Nacional de Identificación y Estado Civil,* RENIEC) was created as an autonomous institution and given jurisdiction over local registries. However, most local registration offices still depended financially and administratively on the municipalities they were located in. It was only after 2007 that RENIEC would require all civil registries to send their registration books to its central storage and processing point.[4]

This process of maintaining a decentralized civil registry system until the beginning of the XXI century is more an exception than the norm in Latin America. Most countries in the region established national civil registries soon after the republican reforms that resulted in the secularization of parish registries.[5]

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[2] Reniec Historia, available at https://www.reniec.gob.pe/portal/html/institucional/instiHistoria.html, accessed on August 25, 2016.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] RENIEC started the implementation of a national plan to support the integration of local civil registries in 2012. It contemplates different venues to ensure the centralization of civil registry documents, including online registration, electronic registration and digitalization of physical documents received in Lima.

[5] Argentina and El Salvador also follow a similar pattern.

RENIEC also established the National Identity Document (DNI) as the exclusive personal identity document for exercising one's right to vote, replacing the electoral card. This marked the beginning of a policy approach that would place a heavier emphasis on the identification system than on the civil registry.

1.3 Political Violence and the Identification and Registry System

In a decentralized civil registration system, the data in the registry is more vulnerable to political turmoil, since civil records kept by municipalities and not replicated to a central registry are more vulnerable to vandalism, accidental destruction, or guerilla assaults.

From the 1980s until 2000s, Peru experienced a period of significant political violence that had a substantial impact on the country's registration and identification systems. The conflict between the Peruvian army and the Shining Path and Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement led to approximately 70,000 deaths and disappearances and left thousands of people undocumented. It caused the destruction of civil registry records, loss or deterioration of civil registry books, omission of birth registrations, and poor civil registration.[6] Many of those who were directly affected by the political violence, mostly in rural areas, did not have a DNI due to their economic situation, lack of access to information or to the urban areas, and also due to the destruction of civil registry offices and documents during that period. People involved in the insurgency and in drug trafficking also intentionally destroyed their identification documents to avoid military and police controls. The Peru Truth and Reconciliation Commission estimates that approximately 600,000 people were displaced because of the conflict. Many of them did not carry their documents and had to register in other civil registry offices, often leading to the duplication of identities.[7] The consequent lack of ID coverage and its unreliability also had a significant impact on the electoral process and on trust in democracy.

Over the past two decades, Peru made several noteworthy efforts to address the effects of political violence on the civil registration and identification systems as well as with regards to other identification challenges. The creation of RENIEC in the mid-nineties was followed by the enactment of many different pieces of legislation, national programs and plans, elevating identification to a state priority.

As in the case of many other Latin American countries, Peru's identification system used to be part of the country's electoral system, and municipal governments were the only entities responsible for civil registry functions. With RENIEC's creation, the institution became responsible for all civil registry functions, including registering and issuing birth, marriage and death certificates, keeping and managing civil status records, as well as the issuance of DNIs. In many other countries these two functions are still separate (e.g. civil registry is under the responsibility of the Ministry of Interior, while electoral tribunals are in charge of the

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[6] According to RENIEC, most of the undocumented victims of the political violence period were women who gave birth to those now known as "sons of the violence," who were a product of rape or sons of fathers who were either executed or disappeared (RENIEC 2012, 72-73).

[7] RENIEC 2012, p. 72-73; Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Peru—Final Report—General Conclusions. Available at http://ictj.org/our-work/regions-and-countries/peru (Accessed on January 20th, 2014).

identification). In Peru, both systems are connected, with the civil registry ideally feeding into and improving the integrity of the ID registry database by providing timely information about births and deaths.

RENIEC was created during the last phase of President Fujimori's autocratic government (1990-2000). With the end of the political violence and Fujimori's departure, restoring registration and DNI coverage became part of a larger process of rebuilding citizens' trust in the Peruvian State and its democratic system. In 2000, a National Agreement was concluded between the Executive branch, Congress, political parties and civil society. The Agreement aimed to support the transition and consolidation of democracy through the issuance and implementation of 30 policies that sought to, among other things, strengthen the democratic political system and promote social development. The restoration of the DNI was one of the top priorities of the Agreement, which opened the way to making it a national policy, prioritized by all administrations and key political actors since then. The DNI was given special attention also for electoral purposes in an effort to restore citizens' trust in the electoral system after controversies in Fujimori's reelection campaign.

Both the creation of RENIEC and the National Agreement therefore laid the foundation for a series of policy decisions that would help turn the identification system into a key priority in the efforts to strengthen the political system and promote social inclusion and development. Throughout the years, RENIEC's role was further strengthened as identification grew in importance in the national agenda.

1.4 Main Policy Decisions: A Focus on the DNI, Social Targeting, and the Child DNI

1.4.1 Peru's Identification Cycle and ID System Infrastructure

As a result of the policy process described above, Peru's ID program became the cornerstone of a broader strategy to build a trusted national ID registry and ID issuing system, to reduce identification coverage gaps, and to improve revenue collection and the targeting of social protection programs.

The Peruvian national identification cycle follows a process that starts at birth, with the issuance of the Certificate of Live Birth, which is provided by public and private health institutions authorized by the Ministry of Health (Figure 1). The Certificate of Live Birth is used for obtaining the birth certificate from RENIEC, its auxiliary offices (including those in hospitals) and Local Civil Registries. When children do not have a Certificate of Live Birth, their parents, caregivers or adult siblings need to provide one of the following documents: (i) sworn statement of a political, judicial, police or religious authority; or exceptionally (ii) baptism record; (iii) school registration record; or as a last resort (iv) a sworn statement of two witnesses.

Birth certificates include a Unique Code Identification Number (CUI)—comprised of 8 digits following a numeric sequential order—which is also used in the DNI, and which becomes a person's key numeric identifier for his/her entire life cycle. In the case of local registries

without Internet connectivity, RENIEC sends the registration books containing a determined number of blank birth certificates to the municipal registry offices (ORECs). Each template has a pre-assigned CUI that follows a sequential order. Every month the OREC sends the record of the issued certificates back to RENIEC, where they are digitalized and stored. When the registry office has online connectivity, the CUI is assigned by the system, also in a sequential order.

Since 2009, birth certificates are free of charge and must be obtained at RENIEC offices or Local Civil Registries up until 60 days after the birth, or until 90 days for people residing in more remote areas. The birth certificate needs to be presented to request a DNI.

Figure 1. Peru Identification Cycle

Source: Authors

Figure 2. Example of Peru's DNI

The DNI includes three main sources of information that are used to verify the identity of the holder: the DNI holder's picture, signature, and fingerprint (Figure 2). To make sure that new or late entries into the Unique Identification Registry are unique and authentic, RENIEC

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carries out the following procedures: automatic fingerprint identification (AFIS), which validates the individual's 10 fingerprints taken at enrollment and stored in her ID datasheet (even if only one is actually shown in the DNI) against the millions stored in the database; and dactylographic and facial recognition checks. Three units of RENIEC's Identification Registry Department perform updating, de-duplication, authenticity and clearance functions. The Department coordinates regularly with the civil registry authorities to cancel the DNIs of deceased people. It is also responsible for running authentication procedures to verify that official documents match the identity of the citizen. It also carries out ex-post evaluations and controls to identify irregularities and further clear the Unique Identification Registry and cancel false or duplicated DNIs.

1.4.2 National Responses

In response to the legacy of political violence, the Peruvian government and RENIEC took the first key policy decision to focus on the identification system over civil registration, in contrast to other countries in the region. It was not until the first period of the current RENIEC administration (2011-2015) that the civil registry was recognized as the backbone of the identification system and that RENIEC started placing more emphasis on its civil registry services and promoting the integration of the two.

A second policy decision, derived from an increased government focus on targeted social programs in the early 2000s, was to improve the targeting capabilities of the system to control for inclusion errors and to ensure that the most vulnerable populations, particularly the more isolated rural and indigenous communities, would have access to those programs. The Peruvian state initiated the implementation of a series of unique policy measures that involved RENIEC, the central government, subnational governments and also relied on the support of civil society organizations and international cooperation agencies. For example, the use of the DNI as the unique source of personal identification by the country's social protection programs has been a key factor in reducing leakages, double dipping, and coverage gaps. Concomitantly, the social protection programs claim to have contributed to the success of RENIEC by promoting the issuance of DNIs to their beneficiaries. For instance, the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program *Juntos* assigned specific resources to pay for the DNI of its beneficiaries, and coordinated efforts with RENIEC to identify undocumented adults and children.

As part of the efforts to improve the targeting system of social programs, in 2001 RENIEC created the National Identification Document for Children.[8] The requirement of a DNI for all children also aimed to combat the abuse of children through trafficking, sexual exploitation and child labor. The implementation of the Child DNI required several strategies. For example, from 2006 until 2009, RENIEC and the Ministry of Health signed several agreements to install Registry Offices in hospitals to support the provision and data integration of birth certificates. Using these offices allows children to be issued a birth certificate, complete with a Unique Identification Code (CUI), in the same place where they are born, thereby starting the process for obtaining their DNI. In addition, there were hundreds of awareness campaigns

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[8] RENIEC 2012, p. 70.

and itinerant registration services, especially in remote areas. Registration procedures were also simplified and the Child DNI was issued free of charge in poor and remote areas, with a specific allocation in the national public budget to finance this initiative. Concurrently, technical innovations and training were introduced at Civil Registry Offices, and Auxiliary Registry Offices (ORAs) were installed in hospitals to help process birth certificates and Child DNI using online templates and biometric information linked to the DNI, such as the child's footprints and picture.[9]

RENIEC was awarded first place for its Child DNI initiative at the prestigious United Nations Public Service Award (UPSA) for the Latin America and Caribbean Region in 2013, and also at the Ibero-American Quality Award granted every year by the *Fundación Iberoamericana para la Gestión de la Calidad* (FUNDIBEQ).

Finally, RENIEC was also the first register in Latin America to obtain ISO certification for the quality of its registry and identification services (ISO 9001: 2008), the quality of its management (ISO 14001:2004), and the security of its information technologies (ISO 2701: 2007) (RENIEC 2015a).

1.4.3 Special Financial Arrangements in Support of DNI Coverage

In the past, RENIEC's constitutionally-guaranteed independent and autonomous status was backed by its financial self-reliance. Almost all of its expenditures were financed by its own revenues, which brought political independence and legitimacy to the national civil registry and identification system. However, growing expenditures linked to improving DNI coverage in poor and remote areas and the national deployment of the Child DNI put RENIEC´s self reliance under growing strain and increased its dependency on external resources.

In 2008, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) adopted a new budgeting approach based on results, the Results Based Budget (*Presupuesto por Resultados*). Initially implemented for a set of strategic programs, the new model of government financing included identification, which further strengthened RENIEC's mandate. The Results Based Budget assigned an amount of resources to RENIEC, linked to the achievement of an agreed goal to reduce identification gaps among the poorest sectors of the population. With these additional resources complementing those from its own revenues, RENIEC was able to provide the DNI free of charge for the most vulnerable populations, and to carry out registration campaigns in the most remote areas.[10] Since then, all Multiannual Macroeconomic Frameworks (2009-2011,

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[9] It should be noted, however, that the identity of infants cannot be uniquely verified using the biometric identifiers alone, as they are based on footprints and picture, which change substantially as children grow older.

[10] On July 25, 2010 the government also approved a special decree (Urgency Decree No 044-2010) recommending that the DNI for children 0-14 years old in rural and urban areas be issued free of charge until the end of 2011. Prior to the Results Based Budget, RENIEC's budget was composed entirely of resources coming from the services it sells (i.e. fees for issuance of DNI, registry fees of other documents, civil status certificates, access to databases, etc.).

2010-2012, 2011-2013 and 2014-2016) included access to DNI as one of their economic policy measures.[11]

The Child DNI initiative garnered other types of financial support from the national government. In 2010, the President of Peru launched a national campaign to provide a DNI free of charge to all children under the age of 14. An additional allocation of resources through the Results Based Budget to finance the issuance of 4 million DNIs complemented the campaign. That same year, the government issued a decree establishing the Municipal Incentives Plan. This plan provided budgetary incentives to local governments linked to the fulfillment of a set of development goals. Early DNI issuance and timely delivery of birth registration books to RENIEC featured among these goals.

Article 12 of the National Budget Law of 2012 also established that, from that year on, all new beneficiaries of social protection programs and other types of targeted support from the government would be required to have DNIs, including children.[12] This legal provision created a strong incentive for the population to register for and collect their DNI. The same law established that the provision of DNI to the Peruvian population was a priority for all national, regional and local governments.

In sum, when compared to other countries in the region, Peru should be considered quite unique. First, while in most countries civil registries entities are part of line ministries or of the electoral system, RENIEC is an autonomous entity, with a specific assigned budget, and its mandate is currently one of the government's political priorities. It also enjoys a high level of public recognition and acceptance. Second, the process of starting with a decentralized system and moving towards integration is quite distinctive of Peru as well, since most countries in the region have followed the opposite course. Third, the provision of DNI for children is also an innovative initiative of the Peruvian system.[13] Fourth, for most of its existence, RENIEC had prioritized the provision of DNI, giving much less importance to its civil registry services, while in most countries this tends to happen the other way around. Finally, simultaneous political will and strong support to DNI issuance and coverage from the central government, civil society, and international development partners also distinguishes Peru's experience in this area.

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[11] The *Marco Macroeconómico Multinanual,* or MMM, is the most important document produced by the government of Peru related to economic policies. It provides estimates and projections for the following three years and analyses the necessary measure that need to be taken by the following administration (Ministerio de Economia y Finanzas de Peru, http://www.mef.gob.pe/ index.php?view=items&cid=1%3Apolitica-economica-y-social&id=24%3A01-ique-es-el-marco-macroeconomico-multianual-mmm&option=com_quickfaq&Itemid=100006—accessed on January 20th, 2014).

[12] RENIEC 2012, p. 28.

[13] Although civil registries in other countries in the region also provide national IDs to children, they are typically not mandatory to travel inside the country and to access social protection benefits, and do not form part of a national policy priority.

2. Recent Trends and Results

2.1 Policy Efforts to Expand Identification Coverage

Today, Peru's identification program has an overall coverage of 98.7 percent of its adult population and of 94.5 percent of all minors, representing a total of 21,014,380 adults and 9,984,833 children and adolescents, as shown in Figures 3-5 below. Most of the undocumented Peruvians are vulnerable populations, such as Indigenous peoples, migrant workers and women in rural areas, who still face administrative, cultural, geographic, and economic barriers to access their identity rights.

When compared to other countries in the region, Peru stands out, together with Argentina, Colombia and Jamaica, as one moving towards universal coverage, which has only been achieved by Chile, Cuba, and Uruguay so far. Other countries with large indigenous populations such as Bolivia and Ecuador reported much lower coverages of 76 percent (2009) and 90 percent (2011) respectively, according to the latest available UNICEF data (2013).

Peru's achievement of such high levels of coverage was the result of several policies implemented over the past decade. One of the first and most remarkable ones was the Integral Reparations Program (PIR) of 2005, created specifically to support people affected by the political violence. The program established the documentation of the victims as one of the modalities of reparation and human rights restitution. It authorized municipalities and Civil Registry and Electoral Offices to accept applications and reapplications for nonexistent or destroyed DNIs with minimum requirements (e.g. witnesses of birth, doctor's or midwife's note, baptismal certificate, etc., hence not all the standard documentation required to process a DNI). By 2014, more than 82,710 people had been registered in the program's Victims' Unique Registry (RUV).[14] Almost 5,800 communities were registered as collective beneficiaries of PIR, including 80 percent located in rural areas and concentrated in only six departments (out of 24) of Peru (RENIEC 2012, 72).

Also in 2005, the government launched the National Plan for the Restitution of Identification: Documenting Undocumented Persons, which concluded in 2009. The main objectives of this plan were to: establish legal procedures that would make the process of acquiring identification more flexible, especially for children; assign special resources to RENIEC to implement activities related to the issuance of birth certificates and DNIs to the most vulnerable populations; and make public authorities and civil society understand the relevance of ensuring the identification of all Peruvians. The plan had specific targets and indicators for its main goals and, according to RENIEC, was successful in achieving more than 85 percent of them. One of its main achievements was the decrease in the number of undocumented people. Between 2005 and 2010, the number of adults without a DNI fell from approximately 1.5 million (9 percent of the Peruvian adult population) to 129,000 (0.68 percent), and the number of children without DNI from 10,445,705 (97.66 percent of all minors) to 4,719,961 (42.72 percent).[15]

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[14] Of this total, 5 percent were direct victims and 95 percent relatives of victims affected by the conflict. Defensoría del Pueblo. (2014). *Balance del Nivel de Cumplimiento del Programa de Reparaciones Económicas Individuales*, retrieved on July 20th 2016 from http://idehpucp.pucp.edu.pe/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Informe-Defensoria-Reparaciones-Economicas.pdf.

[15] Our own estimates based on RENIEC 2012, p. 39 and 111.

**Figure 3. Total population with access to DNI in Peru, 2011—2015**

Source: National Survey of Strategic (Programs (ENAPRES)—INEI; Prepared by Statitics Office. Retrieved from: Ortega de La Torre 2016.

Figure 4. Minor population with access to DNI

Source: National Survey of Strategic (Programs (ENAPRES)—INEI; Prepared by Statitics Office. Retrieved from: Ortega de La Torre 2016.

Figure 5. Adult population with access to DNI, 2011-2015

Source: National Survey of Strategic (Programs (ENAPRES)—INEI; Prepared by Statitics Office. Retrieved from: Ortega de La Torre, 2016.

Under the Plan, poor populations, identified by the Poverty Map elaborated by the Cooperation Fund for Social Development (FONCONDES), were issued the DNI free of charge.[16] From 2005 to 2009, more than 1.8 million Peruvians were able to obtain their DNI without having to pay any fees.[17] In 2009, the government also extended the ordinary process for issuing the birth certificate from 30 to a maximum of 90 days for those living in remote areas (native communities and communities in the country's borders) and simplified the administrative process by making the documentation requirements more flexible.[18]

Another key result of the implementation of the Plan was the inclusion of the identification issue in several public policies. Questions related to identification were included in the national census, and the DNI started to be requested from all beneficiaries applying to social programs. Finally, several measures implemented by the Plan contributed to reducing the political, administrative, legislative, economic and geographic barriers that prevented the most vulnerable populations from accessing their personal identification rights.

Box 1. The government's outreach strategy: the creation of GRIAS and the itinerant campaigns

The establishment of RENIEC's Management Office for the Restitution of Identity and Social Assistance (GRIAS) and the deployment of itinerant identification brigades were crucial in the efforts to reach out the most vulnerable populations. Created in 2004, GRIAS was placed in charge of designing and implementing the National Plan Against the Lack of Documentation and also to carry out social protection activities with communities. The strategy to reach out to the most vulnerable and isolated communities included bringing RENIEC officers equipped with special transportation and mobile identification technologies from one place to another to register citizens and issue their identification documents. They would also organize registration and ID issuance drives, and educational and information campaigns through national and local media.

Parallel to that, in 2002 RENIEC created its own school for registrars, the National School of Civil Registry and Identification (ENRECI), a first of its kind in the region, in order to standardize procedures and improve customer service. The school was later reformed in 2008, becoming the National Center for Registry Studies (CAER) in 2008. It provides capacity building courses and training materials nationwide.[19]

Challenges to bridge the identification gap remained, especially among the most vulnerable and geographically isolated populations, but so did the state's commitment to prioritizing identification. In 2011, another key national policy was launched. The 2011-2015—Peru National Plan Against the Lack of Documentation provided new measures to address the gaps in the provision of birth certificates and DNIs targeted to the most vulnerable populations.

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[16] According to the 2013 Technical Report on Poverty Evolution (*Informe Técnico Evolución de la Pobreza*), in 2012 25,8 percent of the Peruvian population was poor. The majority (53 percent) of this total were residents of rural areas. That same year, extreme poverty reached 6 percent of the population, in which 19.7 percent of the rural population were extreme poor (INEI 2013, p. 28-29; 33-34).

[17] RENIEC 2012, p. 118.

[18] This was established by Law No 29462.

[19] See Capacitación: Escuela Registral, available at https://www.reniec.gob.pe/portal/capacitacionCaer.htm.

The Plan includes a series of activities and procedures to facilitate that process, establishing specific commitments and responsibilities for different institutions, and also revising the targets established under the previous plan. It also has a significant gender focus, implementing specific and transversal measures to reduce gender inequality and prevent discrimination against women, especially in rural areas (RENIEC 2012).[20] Between 2011 and 2016, more than 12,000 itinerant campaigns were carried out.[21]

Box 2. Establishing Partnerships to Improve Coverage

The aforementioned efforts were also supported by partnerships with different entities in the public sector, civil society and international donors. For example, the People's Ombudsman implemented an Identity and Citizenship Program and supported RENIEC in the implementation of documentation campaigns in the ten departments that have been most affected by the political violence. The Ministry of Women and Social Development carried out awareness campaigns about identification and provided workshops for local government staff and local registry officials on how to process the DNI and birth certificates. The Ministry of Health allowed 85 percent of its hospitals and health centers to provide birth certificates free of charge for institutional births, and established that the DNI is the basic standard to identify beneficiaries of health services. The Ministry of Education developed training materials related to the right to identity and helped to register undocumented students. The Ministry of Interior carried out hundreds of informational and training workshops on the right to identity with officials of the judicial system and leaders of community organizations. The National Roundtable Against Poverty (MCLCP), a space that brings together state agencies and civil society groups to coordinate efforts to fight poverty, has also supported the implementation of awareness campaigns and was central to the inclusion of questions related to identity in the national census. Finally, international donors like UNICEF, the German International Cooperation (GIZ), the Inter-American Development Bank, and the World Bank have provided analytical, technical, and financial support to reduce documentation gaps.

2.1.1 Persistent Barriers to Access and Consequent Gaps

Despite all the efforts by RENIEC and the support from other governmental and non-governmental agencies, a group of Peruvians still remains undocumented and therefore excluded from access to several public services. Although the overall gap has substantially shrunk in the last few years—as shown in the previous section—some population groups still face relatively high levels of under-coverage. In 2014, approximately 1.3 percent of the country's adult population did not have a DNI. Among the population aged 18 and under, the gap in the same year was 2.9 percent, as demonstrated in Figure 6 below. However, the DNI gap widens when looking at the younger cohorts in the population. The gap for children under 5 years old, for example, rises to 4.3 percent, and for rural children of the same cohort in the Amazonian regions, the gap reaches 9.5 percent.[22] The gap for children under 5 without birth certificate is also higher (1.4), although it has been steadily declining over the past five years,

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[20] The Plan has two main strategic objectives: (i) to make the most vulnerable populations aware of the importance of identification to exercise their rights and (ii) to have the State adequately attending all the undocumented population (RENIEC 2012, 84-85).

[21] Ortega de la Torre 2016.

[22] Sources ENAHO INEI, and RENIEC 2015b.

as Figure 7 shows. It is likely that these gaps would further increase among children in regions showing the highest poverty rates, augmenting the risk of exclusion for those who more urgently need access to public assistance and early health services.[23]

**Figure 6. Percentage (%) of population without DNI per sub-groups, 2015**

Source: INEI: ENAHO 2015, and RENIEC 2015b.

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[23] In 2010, RENIEC estimated that about 60 percent of the rural population under 18 did not have DNI, in comparison to 40 percent of the same cohort in marginal urban areas. In Amazonian regions like Madre de Dios, Loreto and Amazonas, the average of rural children without DNI was above 70 percent (Plan Nacional Contra la Indocumentación 2011-2015).

Figure 7. Percentage of the Population, per Age Group, whose Birth Certificates were not registered at RENIEC or at the municipal registries (ORECs), 2011-2015

Source: Fuente: INEI, Encuesta Nacional de Programas Presupuestales (EPP).

In summary, improvements in ID coverage were achieved through a two-pronged strategy that consisted of first, subsidizing identification for the poor and children, by creating special budgetary headroom and defining a flexible regulatory frameworks adjusted to special socio-economic conditions of the most vulnerable groups of the population; and second, by using differentiated territorial approaches to overcome geographic, cultural and institutional barriers impeding timely access to civil registration and DNI.

2.2 Prioritizing the DNI over Civil Registry: Tempering Tradeoffs

2.2.1 The Costs and Political Economy of Leaving Behind the Civil Registry

Placing identification at the center of the political agenda allowed for significant improvements in ID coverage. This strategy of prioritizing the DNI coverage of the adult population had critical merits in the Peruvian historical context: it helped the establishment of credible voter rolls, therefore fostering the political re-integration of the country. It also allowed for a relatively quick roll out of a "baseline" ID, first for the adult population, and then for children, creating the conditions for properly registering births backed by the DNI of their parents.

However, this choice made by RENIEC and the national government had its tradeoffs. As a result of prioritizing the national ID over the civil registry, few resources were earmarked for local offices and the development of the civil registry system, in spite of its crucial role as the backbone of a solid ID system. Civil registry information in the country remained highly decentralized, lacking a solid and integrated national database. There are 6,515 decentralized

civil registry offices in Peru. Most of them are located in districts (1,670) and communities (*centros poblados)* (1,786) or native communities (2,663), but also in consulates outside the country (198).[24] Having a DNI system deprived of an integrated and solid civil registry entails substantial weaknesses to its sustainability and robustness. The civil registry is essential for maintaining the flow of information on vital events and ensuring that the DNI database is reliable and updated. Additionally, the cost of developing a DNI system with a poor civil registry is also very high, especially when it comes to achieving full coverage for the Child DNI.

Up until recently, there was little coordination between local registry offices administered by municipalities (ORECs) and RENIEC's civil registry services and database. These municipal offices did not regularly transfer their records to RENIEC. The lack of coordination between decentralized registry offices and RENIEC resulted in an inconsistent flow of vital information from local civil registries to the central database, affecting the reliability and timeliness of identification records and authentication processes. It also has a direct impact on citizens, as it becomes costly and difficult for them to access and authenticate their own records as they move out from the district where their birth or other civil status events were originally registered.

In addition to the important political and historical factors mentioned above that affected RENIEC's and the government's decision to follow a distinctive path that strengthened civil registries and ID enrollment in parallel, there are some political economy factors that further help explain this choice. First, delivering DNIs represented a high economic incentive for RENIEC as fees and public budget transfers linked to their issuance have been one of its main sources of revenue. In contrast, civil registry services are free of charge by law. Second, civil registry performance has not the same appeal to politicians as showing the fulfillment of DNI coverage targets or even delivering DNIs to communities as part of presidential tours.

In more recent years, however, RENIEC acknowledged the need to also prioritize civil registration and improve the existing system. Its latest efforts have helped to address the lack of integration and low quality of information, as it will be discussed below.

2.2.2 Centralizing Civil Registry Documentation and Redefining the Rules of Engagement between RENIEC and Municipal Registries (ORECs)

As part of the process to integrate the civil registry records and correct the aforementioned problems, in 2011 the government enacted a law that allowed RENIEC to require that the local registry offices send the registry records to their central office in a timely manner. To further support this effort, in 2012 the Ministry of Economy and Finance launched the Incentives for the Municipal Modernization Plan. The Plan included the transfer of additional resources to the municipalities linked to the fulfillment of a given set of goals, among them the fulfillment of RENIEC´s timely data transfer requirement for municipal registries. RENIEC also created an office entirely dedicated to the integration process. This office collects the books from the municipal offices, which have been receiving technological and

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[24] Ortega de la Torre 2016.

capacity building support, and digitizes them into one database. The goal is to have all records online and integrated in one larger and centralized database. In spite of current efforts, a large number of local civil registries still do not have the human resources and technical infrastructure to carry out their registry functions and tasks effectively.

Although the process to improve the civil registry system by integrating the information into a national database through digitization and the qualification of decentralized offices has been happening for some time, the approach taken has changed during this process.

The policy pursued by the previous RENIEC administration, which ended in 2010, was to progressively rely less on the municipal registries (*Oficinas de Registro del Estado Civil,* ORECs)— which did not have sufficient capacity and did not meet RENIEC's standards—focus on the digitization of historical records, and eventually replace them with RENIEC's own de-concentrated offices and Auxiliary Registry Offices (ORAs) based in hospitals. The administration assumed that by providing birth certificates at these locations they would solve the documentation gap. As of December 2015, 70 percent of birth certificates had been digitalized, and out of the 424 RENIEC offices, 92 were hospital based ORAs.[25] However, this strategy did little to solve the documentation gap for indigenous women who had no access to hospitals to give birth nor to the registry offices located far from their communities. Hence the children and population most in need remained undocumented.

This approach elicited opposition from mayors, who felt that their mandate and authority over their jurisdictions was jeopardized by the capital, Lima. The relationship between RENIEC and the ORECs has always been tense. ORECs are financed by the municipalities and depend administratively on the local government (the mayor appoints their staff). However, according to the law, they are functionally accountable to RENIEC. The latter perceived that this dual subordination of ORECs had resulted in weak accountability towards RENIEC and made them susceptible to all sorts of improper information handling and errors, including violations of basic security rules that led to the unauthorized disclosure, alteration, and destruction of personal data. Some ORECs were also suspected of involvement in corruption and drug trafficking.[26]

With the change in RENIEC's administration in 2011 (the current administration was elected in 2011 and reelected for a second term in 2015), there was a shift in policy. While RENIEC continued to promote the digitalization of all civil registry information, it also decided to strengthen the ORECs that had a minimum level of capacity, for example by providing them with access to the internet, or in its absence, to ensure that they would submit their books on a monthly basis. At the same time, RENIEC also continued with its de-concentration policy, creating offices in hospitals and birth centers. This shift in policy was critical, since ORECs, although vulnerable in some respects, are the offices closest to the population.

In principle and according to the law, the birth certificates issued by RENIEC and its ORAs have the same value and hold the same requirements for issuance as those issued by the

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[25] RENIEC, Plan Operativo Annual 2016.

[26] Types of corruption identified in some facilities included making fake registries so that criminals could process fake DNIs.

municipal level ORECs. Nevertheless, birth certificates issued by RENIEC and ORAs today are processed online and immediately trigger the process to issue the DNI of the newborn. In contrast, the majority of birth certificates issued by ORECs are manually processed and their registration in the central database may take several days. The child's parents need to take additional steps to request the issuance of the DNI at the nearest RENIEC office, ORA, or RENIEC's ambulatory service. The appearance of the copies of birth certificates provided to the petitioner changes depending on her year and place of registration. Templates for the original birth certificates, and therefore their appearance, have changed over time, and still many issued by ORECs are handwritten. For example, before 2006, birth certificates issued by ORECs did not include the CUI.

Currently, the total number of district and provincial ORECs operating by delegation of RENIEC is 1742. As of July 2016, there were 1037 ORAFs (provincial, district and *centro poblado* ORECs affiliated and reporting to the Online Registry System);[27] and RENIEC had revoked or absorbed a total of 18 ORECs (3 from Lima and Callao).[28]

To summarize, efforts to strengthen and integrate the civil registry with the ID system have followed a three-pronged strategy that included: i) strengthening the existing ORECs with a minimum level of capacity; ii) continuing with the process of setting up birth registry offices at hospitals that respond directly to RENIEC; iii) and absorbing ORECs that had no capacity to operate properly.

2.3 Integration with Social Programs

2.3.1 The Child DNI, Social Targeting and the Unintended Exclusionary Effects of Budget Law 2012

One of the potential benefits of having a Child DNI (and the underlying digital registry) is being able to integrate social and health programs and cross reference information using the DNI number as the single identification code. It can also help to improve authentication of the child's identity, reduce leakages in targeted programs, enhance health and nutrition monitoring, and the early identification of children to reduce exclusion errors.

Box 3. Preliminary Impacts of the Child DNI on Peru's CCT Juntos

The potential benefits of the Child DNI digital registry to improve the targeting of social protection programs can be seen in the case of Juntos Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCT). The program was launched in 2005 to help reduce poverty by providing cash transfers to the most vulnerable households and to break the intergenerational transmission of poverty by promoting improvements in access to education and health services. The cash transfer is conditional on child beneficiaries attending regular health checks and being present for at least 85 percent of the school year. The government piloted an innovative intervention in the District of Fiúra, in the Piura Region, in order

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[27] https://www.reniec.gob.pe/portal/html/agencia/ofiyafiliadas.html.

[28] RENIEC, Plan Operativo Annual 2016.

to improve the transfer of information from the program intervention areas and to strengthen and streamline operational procedures in the identity, nutrition, health, and education services. Using a combination of the DNI database, fingerprint pads and smart cell phones to verify the compliance of 7,611 beneficiaries with their responsibilities, the program significantly reduced gaps in child identification, and increased coverage by 18.33 percent in 6 months (from 76.19 percent of the total number of children attending the schools of the pilot to 94.52 percent). By cross-checking compliance with the education responsibility (that is to say, school attendance) and the CCT database linked to the ID, the pilot allowed for the identification of children attending school that were not registered in *Juntos*, despite meeting the programs eligibility criteria. This situation often arose from parents' negligence to register other than their first child in the program, because the monetary incentive does not increase with the registration of additional children in the household. The intervention also helped to optimize the time and accuracy of compliance verification (e.g. using fingerprints to verify school attendance reduced the time needed to check attendance by 70.6 percent compared to the baseline). According to school directors, it also generated a greater sense of responsibility and increased punctuality among children and parents. Additionally, the availability of online information about children's identity and nutrition status allowed for a quicker response to cases that needed immediate attention. Finally, the combination of a digital DNI registry and Information Communications Technology (ICT) also improved and accelerated the flow of information from the field to the servers of RENIEC and of other institutions working with *Juntos*.

Source: Perova and Vakis, 2013, "5 years in *Juntos*: new evidence on the program's short and long-term impacts."

The Peruvian Child DNI initiative therefore provides a good example of how integrated efforts to make use of the personal ID system can help expand coverage and prioritize populations that face the greatest barriers to access social and other public services.

However, despite the apparent progressiveness of this initiative, the requirement of a Child DNI to access some social programs could also have an exclusionary effect. This is particularly true if the possession of the Child DNI becomes a prerequisite to access targeted programs or health services, or even to attend the school. In other words, a measure created to reduce errors of inclusion may become an exclusion factor for the most vulnerable populations.

The registration of newborns in the non-contributive health insurance program (SIS), experienced a dramatic fall, from 11,759 in 2011 to only 966 in 2012 in the 156 poorest districts of Amazonas, Huánuco and Cajamarca regions once the 2011 Budget Law, requiring the possession of a Child DNI for children to register as beneficiaries of targeted social programs, came into force.[29] Although this drop cannot be attributed solely to the ID requirement, because the SIS implemented interim measures to allow children without a DNI to register temporally, it is likely that mothers, unaware of this transitory provision, stopped registering their children.[30] The fact that, according to the INEI, 18 percent of children under 5 years in

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[29] Source: SIS Database.

[30] During the same period, in addition to the DNI requirement, the national targeting system required certification of eligibility to enroll in SIS and other social programs. This requirement may have also affected the enrolment of newborns in SIS, although most of the households from the poorest districts qualified by default as eligible through the geographic targeting procedure.

the poorest districts of Peru (*Juntos* districts) did not have access to DNI in 2011 supports the hypothesis that one of the causes of the drop in infant registration in SIS was the DNI requirement.

A significant rebound in infant chronic malnutrition in the poorest rural quintiles of the Amazonas region in 2011 and 2012 (see Figure 8) suggests that making the Child DNI a requirement for registering children for the SIS might have had negative effects beyond the drop in infant SIS registration. Although, given the multi-causality associated to nutrition results, this trend cannot be solely attributed to the enforcement of the law and the reduction of child early enrolment in SIS, it is reasonable to think that among populations with low DNI coverage, like Amazonian children, mothers might have opted out of taking their children to the health centers for their timely nutrition checks, because they were not covered by health insurance.

Figure 8. Amazonas Region: Infant Chronic Malnutrition (Age 0-5) Juntos Districts (2008-2013)

Source: USAID: DHS Program.

2.3.2 Recent Improvements: Boosting Social Inclusion and Reducing Exclusion Risks of Integration

By 2013, new policies began to be implemented to correct these unwanted effects. The Budget Law was made flexible enough to allow children to have provisional registration for the social programs, even if they did not have a DNI. More recently, new regulation established that children from indigenous communities were exempt from the stipulations of the Budget Law, and can granted full and permanent access to the SIS and other targeted social programs even without a DNI.

Other efforts were made to facilitate the issuance of the Child DNI. Between 2006 and 2009, RENIEC and the Ministry of Health signed several agreements to establish Auxiliary Registry Offices (ORAs) in hospitals. As discussed earlier, these offices support the universal and timely

provision of birth certificates and integration across different registries by enabling children to obtain their documentation, including a CUI number, in the same place where they are born, and thereby starting the process of obtaining their DNI.

More recently, in 2014, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Health, local governments and RENIEC established an alliance to build the *Padron Nominal Homologado*, a database of children under the age of 6 , which integrates information from different institutions and databases, such as health centers, municipal civil registries, and the national identification registry, to improve early registration of children by the health and nutrition services and RENIEC. By 2015, the *Padron Nominal* had helped to identify 53,000 children without a DNI. RENIEC is already reaching out to their families to process their identification documents.

While RENIEC was responsible for designing the *Padron Nominal* software and procedures, municipal governments played a key role in gathering information from the different agencies to set up this integrated database, including their civil registry offices. In some regions, as part of a pilot program, this database is used to monitor the coverage of early nutrition targets, which are crucial to cut down ICM incidence.

Although the existence of *Padron Nominal* may raise some privacy issues since the exchange of information across these databases allows for the collection and access to detailed information about a child (e.g. where she/he lives, whether the child made health checkups, etc.), the institutions involved are convinced that the benefits of the initiative outweigh the potential harm to children and their families.

2.4 Maintaining Personal Data Protection

Although personal data protection is a concern in many countries, until recently, this has not been a key issue in Peru. However, mounting international awareness about the implications of the use of personal data could change the current situation. In fact, the Peruvian state put forward a new legal and institutional framework to tackle this concern, through the creation of the Personal Data Protection Law and the National Authority for Personal Data Protection (ANPDP) in 2011. ANPDP falls under the supervision of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.[31] The Law and bylaws also stipulated the establishment of the National Register of Personal Data Protection, which keeps a public record of all the data processors and the type of data being collected.

Given the embryonic state of the Law's implementation and its slow progress, personal data protection largely depends on RENIEC's ability, as the manager of National Civil Registry and the ID Registry, to mainstream privacy and identity protection measures into its policies and everyday business. The institution has made progress in the implementation of safeguards to protect personal data against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data. High standards (included in ISO/IEC 27002) for initiating, implementing, maintaining and improving information security management policies are being

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[31] An English translation of the Law is available online at
http://web.ita.doc.gov/ITI/itiHome.nsf/1dd3c7c4faeeff0585256ccb00657bab/112a1a2f4d01989c
85257a78004dd2ec/$FILE/Peru%20Data%20Protection%20Law%20July%2028_EN.pdf.

applied. However, RENIEC still faces important challenges regarding the secure management of personal data at the bottom of its decentralized civil registry system. Weak or non-existent controls and lack of accountability at the Municipal Registries (ORECs) make them vulnerable to security breaches that have led to unauthorized disclosure, modification, and destruction of personal data. Problems like these should become less prevalent as the digitalization and integration process of the civil register reaches its final stage.

The story is less optimistic with respect to other aspects of personal data protection, like those related to information collection and sharing. Although RENIEC has guidelines and protocols regulating data collection, disclosure, and sharing, in practice, the institution falls short of fully complying with reasonable standards in this matter, such as those related to data-collection restraint and data-use limitation. The tension between complying with data protection standards and making use of identification information to meet transparency and social inclusion purposes reaches a critical level in the delivery of social protection services, which frequently publish their beneficiary rolls in order to improve transparency, reduce leakages, and expand their coverage.

2.5 Sustainability

All the measures and results described in the previous sections emphasize the uniqueness of the Peruvian identification system and of RENIEC in particular, and point to the sustainability of its operating model.

From a financial perspective, RENIEC has increasingly become less self-reliant. Although self-generated resources have been steady in the last three years, at about S./ 200 million per year, other sources of income, like transfers from the National Budget and other external sources, have increased over the same period of time, as shown by Figure 9. That amount has gone from S./ 83,552,130 in 2013 to S./ 133,870,811 in 2015, or from 24 percent of total income in 2013 to 32 percent in 2015.[32] In 2015, total actual revenues amounted to S./ 331,784,638, approximately US $104,237,443 (see table included in Annex 1).[33]

In the last three years, revenues associated with DNI issuance have also fallen as a percentage of its total own generated income.[34] This reduction is the result of its successful effort of achieving a high DNI coverage in a relatively short period of time, as discussed in previous sections. As DNI possession reaches 100 percent, revenues generated by its issuance and renewal will increase in relation to the natural growth of the Peruvian population. Therefore, from an income perspective, RENIEC's core businesses will change over time. While the DNI related business is becoming less relevant as a percentage of its own generated revenues, there are emerging business streams that have gained importance over the last two years, and will probably continue to rise. These are the provision of information and access to databases, and

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[32] Source: RENIEC's Financial Statements 2014 and 2015.

[33] At an annual average exchange rate of 0.314 Nuevos Soles per US Dollar.

[34] DNI related revenues encompass charges for DNI issuance, renovation, copy and registration.

certifications.[35] As Figure 10 shows, these emerging business streams already represented 70 percent of RENIEC's own generated revenues in 2015.

**Figure 9. RENIEC' Sources of Income 2013-2015**

Figure 10. RENIEC's Core Income Businesses 2013-2015

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[35] In addition to certifications and authentication services, like those provided to public notaries, RENIEC offers access to information services to commercial banks and mobile phone companies. It charges differential fees to those private clients for accessing DNI datasheets containing personal identification information, which they use in their banking or sell-point transactions. RENIEC has the option of individual consultations or dedicated line consultations.

RENIEC has also followed a policy of reducing its payroll by improving efficiency and promoting technological automation. This process, coupled with de-concentration efforts, has had a clear impact on the size of RENIEC personnel. The number of staff in the institution has declined by approximately 30 percent in the past 5 years, as Figure 11 shows.

Figure 11. Number of RENIEC Staff, 2010-2015

The key pillars of RENIEC's sustainability, however, are not only related to its ability to generate its own resources. The strong integration with social programs, with the DNI becoming the key document to access services, has granted recognition and support to the institution and helped to make identification a national policy, with assigned resources from the federal government to reach out to the most vulnerable.

RENIEC's institutional autonomy has also given it great stability across political transitions, which has in turn led to high levels of political recognition and trust by the population. It is not seen as a political instrument, but rather as a technical and autonomous government body. A survey in 2006 found that Peruvians trusted RENIEC more than other institutions including the Catholic Church (Harbitz and Boekle, 2009). This recognition was recently reconfirmed by the Peruvian Electoral Profile 2016, a national (urban-rural) survey entrusted by the National Electoral Tribunal to IPSOS Peru and the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP). According to this study, 69 percent of Peruvians trust or trust something in RENIEC, 12 points above the entity that holds the second place, the Catholic Church, and 24 points above the Armed Forces, which came in third place.[36]

Its integration with the social protection system, its autonomy, and the consequent national and political recognition have made RENIEC sustainable overtime.

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[36] "Según el "Perfil Electoral Peruano 2016"—RENIEC es la institución que genera más confianza. Available at https://www.reniec.gob.pe/portal/detalleNota.htm?nota=00001133. Acessed on August 25, 2016.

3. Conclusions and Lessons for Other Countries

3.1 Addressing Remaining Challenges

The origins, structure, financing mechanisms, high coverage, and the integration with social programs are some of the characteristics that make Peru's civil registry and identification system unique in the region, and a case worth studying. However, critical challenges remain.

Continuing current efforts to reduce DNI coverage gaps undertaken by GRIAS, such as itinerant campaigns and brigades in areas with the highest gaps, and the use of culturally sensitive approaches in Amazonian regions, as well as the scaling up of the *Padron Nominal* pilot to cover the whole country could yield promising results.

Similar methods could be explored by other countries facing similar challenges. The *Padron Nominal* approach has proven to be effective in reducing identification gaps in difficult to reach areas and for vulnerable groups of the population. It involved the establishment of local alliances to build a data exchange and share information across systems to enable the timely and personalized detection of DNI gaps.

3.1.1 Managing the Social Exclusion Risks of the Child DNI

As discussed in the previous sections, Peru has made one of the most extraordinary efforts globally to provide a DNI to all children. The country has achieved outstanding results in terms of coverage by creating an incentive for households to request a Child DNI at an early age and through the integration of the DNI with social protection programs. However, exclusion risks arising from making the Child DNI a requirement to access targeted social programs, especially for very young children living in poor rural districts with lower DNI coverage, need to be addressed. This is particularly true for social programs like SIS, which finances the access of poor families to health services. In these cases, it is very likely that the costs of exclusion from primary health services resulting in chronic malnutrition and a higher incidence of contagious diseases considerably exceed that of inclusion errors or potential fraud.

One possible alternative for Peru and other countries is to use the child's birth certificate linked to the mother's DNI as the main source of authentication for checking eligibility and monitoring child health targets. The Child DNI does not offer additional authentication elements to the birth certificate for young children. The foot- or fingerprint and picture do not work as unique identifiers since foot- and fingerprint patterns and facial features change substantially within a short period of time for young children. Once the child reaches school age, the Child DNI could be requested to replace the birth certificate in order to maintain their registration. Data show that the DNI gap narrows to almost zero for children above 6 years of age.

The limitations that the use of pictures and finger- or footprints present for using the child DNI as a reliable source of authentication could be addressed by further exploring the use of recently developed iris recognition technologies and applications. For example, in mid-2015,

the Kenya Ministry of Education, Science and Technology implemented an iris-based biometric system in order to provide an accurate attendance tracking for all students in class (roll-call) or on school buses (getting on/off tracking).[37]

3.1.2 Centralization vs. Decentralized Approaches to Civil Registry Integration

One of the most crucial challenges for Peru, and probably for other countries that have followed a similar path, is integrating the civil registration system at the national level, and setting up this system as the backbone of the DNI registry. There are two critical matters at play to address this challenge: (i) the full integration of local civil registry information into the national civil registry database; and the establishment of a consistent and constant flow of vital information from this database into the DNI registry. This process has shown to be thorny and slow. As discussed above, it was only after 2007 that RENIEC required that all civil registries send their registration books to its central storage and processing point. Most of the local registry information (the current and the historical) is kept in physical records; many of those records are in bad condition or contain registration errors. In some cases, the books go through a lengthy journey to reach the processing point in Lima. Processing and digitizing the information also takes time, and often involves correcting faulty records or sending them back to the local registry.

RENIEC's current two-pronged approach towards a more centralized system, which involves closing some municipal registry offices and establishing RENIEC's own offices at the provincial level and in hospitals while strengthening municipal registries at the same time by improving their connectivity and capacity to do online registration (hence, strengthening Peru's decentralized registry system), has proven to be a good strategy so far to address these challenges. This approach preserves the extensive network of municipal and community registries that is necessary to reach out to distant rural households, while continuing to open new RENIEC offices in strategic points to facilitate the registration of children born in birth/delivery institutions.[38]

Moving away from the systematic closing of municipal registry offices seems to be working better because it has helped to smooth tensions between RENIEC and local governments. When a municipal office is closed, the municipality usually reacts against its closure. Local governments perceive the provision of civil registry services to the population as one of their vital functions and as a source of income. When RENIEC's previous administration resorted to office closures as the main integration strategy, mayors lobbied against it, creating a political obstacle to the reform.

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[37] The solution includes IriTech's IriShield camera connecting to a low cost Android phone or tablet via USB cable. Iris matching is done on-board of IriShield whose internal gallery can hold up to 500 identities (expandable to 5,000 identities) which is more than enough for most of the schools. The local matching capability is a particular advantage in the school-bus scenario because it does not require wireless/3G communication between the biometric terminal in the bus and a back-end server (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iris_recognition).

[38] A study found that distance from the household to the registry office strongly correlates with the occurrence of young children without a birth certificate (Reuben and Cuenca 2009). Therefore, revoking local registries in distant areas and replacing them by RENIEC's provincial or auxiliary offices can work against child registration coverage and timeliness.

3.1.3 Institutional Dimensions: RENIEC's autonomy and financial independence

One of the main institutional characteristics of RENIEC is its autonomy. It brings political independence and legitimacy to the national civil registry. In the past, this constitutional status was backed by its financial self-reliance. Almost all of its expenditures were financed by its own revenues. However, three recent developments have substantially increased RENIEC's expenditures: (i) the campaign to close the DNI gap in the adult population; (ii) the deployment of the Child DNI initiative; and (iii) the integration of the national civil registry system. All those developments are positive and necessary. However, these efforts are subsidized, raising questions about the long-term financial independence of the institution.

As explained above, RENIEC has so far been able to cover increasing expenditures with the support of resources allocated to it by the central government through specific budget programs. But these budget allocations have been the result of negotiations with the MEF or specific line ministries, which, under certain circumstances, could compromise its autonomy. It is true that the costs of closing the DNI and Child DNI coverage gaps diminish as they get closer to zero. However, maintaining sufficient revenue flows to ensure high coverage in the future will require the generation of additional resources in order to avoid RENIEC's financial dependency on the central government. Additionally, RENIEC will face high incremental unit costs in fulfilling its goal of closing the remaining gap, since the costs to reach the population living in remote areas are much higher. Estimates show that the costs of providing an ID in the jungle areas is almost four times higher than in the coastal area (Figure 12).[39] Hence, it is critical that RENIEC define a strategy to generate more resources.

Figure 12. Variable ID Enrolment Costs by Geographic Region in Peru 2014 (US$)

Source: World Bank. Social Protection and Labour: South-South Learning Forum: Rwanda 2014.

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[39] Gelb, Alan. The Economics of ID Systems: How to Frame the Business Case? Presentation made in Kigali on May 24, 2016. Center for Global Development.

An excellent potential source of revenue for civil and ID registries is providing ID information and authentication services to private entities like banks, mobile phone companies and notaries. As stated above, this is an emerging business stream that, in 2015 already represented 34 percent of RENIEC's self-generated revenues. However, in order to expand this business and gain efficiency, RENIEC could make further investments in cutting edge technologies to improve authentication and dedicated-line services, and online consultations that would bolster its own revenues and financial independence and resilience. Although, with the exception of the home address, the information accessed through these services by private operators is limited to standard identification data,[40] new technologies that enable the implementation of stringent encryption norms and data-use audits as well as audit-trail software could help ensure that the information offered would meet personal data protection standards.

3.1.4 The Tradeoff between Personal Data Protection, Transparency and Integration

The tension between protecting personal data stored in ID documents and civil registries, and the need to respond to information sharing demands for the operation of public interest services, enhanced transparency, and reduced transaction costs can be resolved. The observance of data protection principles should not become an obstacle for the establishment of agile and effective interoperation agreements and information disclosure practices.

Reducing unnecessary confidential information visible on the DNI may be a reasonable way to improve the protection of individual end-users against the misuse of data by a third party. One point of contention is the inclusion of the holder's exact address in the DNI. Since the DNI already includes the person's voting group, which defines the respective ballot center, this information is unnecessary for the organization of the polling processes. Furthermore, nowadays the address information changes frequently, making the DNI obsolete or inaccurate before the expiration date. Personal addresses could be kept in the ID database for the strict use of the police or the judiciary, if needed. Still, the police and the judiciary would need to create or have access to other sources of information, because, as stated above, the address registered on the database might not be reliable. The same principle should apply to access to ID information services.

As suggested above, cutting edge information technologies offer new solutions to data sharing without jeopardizing personal data protection principles and protocols. The use and adoption of these technological innovations is a sensible path that RENIEC and other civil registries

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[40] Access to personal data is limited to the person's DNI number, names, sex, date and place of birth, civil status, parents' names, picture, home address, signature and right and left thumb fingerprints. The information accessed depends on the level of access granted by RENIEC to the user. Yet these data never include any personal information resulting from the integration of the DNI database with other databases like the Ministry of Health's or the Ministry of Interior's, which would represent a serious threat to the individual's privacy and integrity.

may follow in order to keep offering interoperable data services, which are crucial to public programs and to the private sector.[41]

It is debatable whether the replication of the Peruvian data sharing model, strongly inclined towards interoperability and supporting social and economic development programs, is feasible or advisable in conflict-affected countries, where the risks of personal data abuse and leakages may carry dreadful consequences. However, the weaknesses shown by the Peruvian ID system with respect to personal data protection are not concomitant to its inter-operational model. These weaknesses can be dealt with while maintaining the system's development objectives. Conflict-affected countries like Pakistan have built an ID system with a unique and highly integrated national ID that is providing strong support to social protection programs and financial services without compromising personal data protection safeguards and principles.

3.1.5 Lessons for Other Countries

Peru offers a remarkable example of a country that established identification as a national priority. Starting with the creation of the National Civil Registry and Identification Registry of Peru (RENIEC) in 1995, it has built up one of the strongest and most inclusive national identification programs in the world, including for children. RENIEC is responsible for both civil registration and identification services. It followed a determined approach to reach out to remote areas and indigenous communities by creating a specific directorate and implementing culturally sensitive methodologies. Its experience offers many lessons for other countries with huge registration gaps and diverse populations seeking to accomplish SDG16.9, to provide legal identity for all, including birth registration.

A distinctive feature of the RENIEC story is the relationship between civil registration and the national identification system. In contrast to most Latin American countries, which developed both systems in parallel, Peru prioritized national identification in response to the need to re-integrate the country after an insurgency that displaced some 600,000 people and destroyed many records. Only later were efforts made to incorporate local civil registries, managed by municipalities, into a single national system led by RENIEC, and to integrate them into the identification system. The approach included performance-based transfers to the municipalities to encourage the timely submission of data. It offers insights for the many countries struggling to integrate separate civil registration and ID systems.

Another notable feature of RENIEC is its unique autonomous status—guaranteed by the constitution and independent from any ministry or political body. In line with this status, it was also planned to be financially self-supporting, with costs covered by service fees. This "commercial" model is of interest to many countries facing financial constraints but raises the question of how to fund the provision of ID as a social good. RENIEC's own resources later

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[41] For example the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA) from Pakistan has developed an audit-trail software whereby every data transaction is noted in the database, so that each citizen is able to check who has accessed his or her data (Malik, Tarik. Technology in the Service of Development: The NADRA Story. CGD 2014).

came to be supplemented by performance-based grants from government to cover the cost of extending ID services to poor and remote people as well as to children. But independence appears to have been valuable—national surveys place RENIEC as the most trusted institution in Peru, even ahead of the Catholic Church.

Peru's experience therefore offers useful insights for other countries, including those that start out with severe dislocations due to civil conflict and need to re-build an integrated nation. But it also offers some cautions. Even though it was necessary to prioritize ID in the early stages, the long-delayed attention to strengthening civil registration has prolonged some difficulties and made it harder to maintain an updated database. The requirement that children be registered for services has expanded coverage and strengthened the implementation of conditional transfer programs but it might also have led to a fall in the number of newborns registered into health and nutrition programs. More attention is needed to data privacy and protection; this area has not been a major problem in the past, but could assume a higher profile as more electronic data is collected. Finally, loss of financial autonomy—and therefore institutional independence—is also a risk. The financial model will need to adapt in response to lower fees from the issue of IDs since there are now few unregistered people while, at the same time, the unit costs of "last mile" registration are far higher for people in remote and isolated areas.

4. Annex 1

RENIEC Income Sources[42]	2013	2014	2015
Own Sources	**S/.200,549,679.00**	**S/.200,031,406.00**	**S/.197,913,827.00**
DNI Duplication, Renovation, Issuance	S/.125,531,917.00	S/.110,128,423.00	S/.78,818,017.00
Certifications, Rectifications and Updates	S/.8,243,432.00	S/.20,421,204.00	S/.29,503,269.00
Issuance of Birth and Civil Status Certificates	S/.15,685,782.00	S/.15,346,531.00	S/.18,352,509.00
Provision and Access to Information	S/.47,818,335.00	S/.52,957,927.00	S/.67,161,319.00
Other Services	S/.3,270,213.00	S/.1,177,321.00	S/.4,078,713.00
Transferences from Treasury and Other Sources	**S/.68,576,374.00**	**S/.75,202,794.00**	**S/.106,657,600.00**
Ordinary Resources from National Budget	S/.68,576,374.00	S/.70,640,294.00	S/.99,165,319.00
Donations	S/.0.00	S/.4,562,500.00	S/.7,492,281.00
Other Revenues	**S/.14,975,756.00**	**S/.27,350,013.00**	**S/.27,213,211.00**
Financial Revenues	S/.314,522.00	S/.603,477.00	S/.1,439,246.00
Electoral Fees	S/.12,149,427.00	S/.19,519,407.00	S/.22,150,725.00
Other	S/.2,511,807.00	S/.7,227,129.00	S/.3,623,240.00
TOTAL	**S/.284,101,809.00**	**S/.302,584,213.00**	**S/.331,784,638.00**
US $[43]	105,376,201.98	106,425,827.15	104,237,443.29

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[42] Source: RENIEC Financial Statements 2014 and 2015

[43] Estimated at the annual average exchange rate

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