# New Zealand Report Card: 'Still in the leading bunch – more to do' Personal analysis & observations



Government (Internal Affairs Dept)



NZ Post (an SOE)

http://realme.govt.nz

### Background: New Zealand's culture, policy and legislation

- Privacy legislation (EU-like) e.g. citizen controls use of/ release of data
- No national ID or ID card, no exchange of biometrics
- Low national security or illegal immigration drivers
- No Inter-agency data matching excl. few exceptions
- Citizen opt-in: Not compelled to use online services
- Agency opt-in: Not compelled to deliver via online
- Low risk, low budget approach (population: 4m)

#### Policy principles that are reflected eslewhere..

## NZ Govt policy principles (2002) for authenticating people

US NSTIC's guiding principles (2011)

- Security
- Acceptability
- Protection of privacy
- All-of-government approach
- Fit for purpose
- Opt-in

- Secure & Resilient
- Easy to use
- Privacy enhancing
- Interoperable

- Cost effective
- Voluntary

## Back in 2005 we set out to address 3 issues

#### The First Issue




#### The Second Issue

- Keeping track of username and password for each online service was bad enough.
- We knew it would become worse when online services moved to two-factor authentication: "Necklace of tokens."


#### And The Third Issue

 People have to use documents to establish their identity with each government agency individually



#### Our approach to online authentication

- Two foundation services both centralised but separate – identity and logon management
- Separate who a person is (identity) from logon management functions - from what they do (activity)
- Decentralise authorisation and privilege management out to the edge



igovt identity verification service

igovt logon service

#### So we built 2 separate things:

- **igovt** pseudonymous logon service

- **igovt** Identity (attribute)
Verification Service (IVS) that
releases identity info or pseudo
hashes has explicitly directed by the
identity owner

#### Architecture for logon Authentication – 2006/7

- pseudonymous logon management (the FLT) carries no PI, designed in privacy and security with functions separated
- Take off the bottom row and the last column: what do you see?



### 'OMB M 04 04 – like' Identity proofing – maybe extendable to organisations, software, devices - online

EOI objective	Low EOI Confidence Level	Moderate EOI Confidence Level	High EOI Confidence Level
A – Identity exists (i.e. to determine that the identity is not fictitious)	1 document	1-2 documents (including at least one with photograph, if possible)	1-2 documents (including at least one with photograph, if possible)  or  Verification against 1-2 source records held by issuing agency
B – Identity is a 'living identity'	(No specific process)	(No specific process)	Verification against the death register or Business processes for Objective C
C – Presenter 'links' to identity	(No specific process)	Verification by trusted referee or In-person verification	Verification by trusted referee  or In-person verification  or Biometric recognition where the agency has authorised access to a database containing the individual's biometric information  and Interview (in cases where suspicion is raised over individual's identity)
D – Presenter is sole claimant of identity	Check against agency records	Check against agency records	individual's identity)  Check against agency records
E – Presenter uses identity (i.e. use in the community)	At least 1 document/ record	At least 1 document/ record or Business processes for Objective C	At least 2 document/records or Business processes for Objective C

### ..and mapped to NZ's 'NIST 800-63- like' Authn Credential Strength Standard .. looks dated now..

Determine Service Risk Category	Apply applicable EOI Confidence levels	Apply applicable Authentication keys
Nil or negligible	None	No specific recommendation.
Low	<ul><li>EOI genuine and identity used in community.</li><li>EOI accepted on 'face value'.</li></ul>	One-factor key: -Password conforming to the Password Standard e.g. igovt password.
Moderate	<ul> <li>EOI genuine and identity used in community.</li> <li>Individual confirmed as genuine claimant of the identity.</li> <li>EOI accepted on 'face value'.</li> </ul>	Two-factor key that is at least:  - One-time password system + password e.g. igovt password and igovt code.  - One-time password device + per-session activation with a password or a biometric.  - Software token + per-session activation with a password or a biometric.
High	<ul> <li>EOI genuine and identity used in community.</li> <li>Individual confirmed as genuine claimant of the identity.</li> <li>EOI verified by third party.</li> </ul>	Two-factor key that is at least: - Hardware token + per-session activation with a password or biometric.

In 2010/11 the government wanted a partner to leverage what it had built... enter ..



## about the time the US NSTIC was being drafted







login Service (currently igovt logon)



(when needed) identity assurance services



SP/RP has confidence in user's identity (in advance of applying authz policy)



Confirms that this is the same dog/person/entity as last interaction





Confirms core identity information from Internal Affairs' igovt identity Verification Service and address from NZ Posts Address Verification service

**UNIQUENESS** 



**IVS** 



New Zealand Post





Other providers to come







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





Other providers to come

#### + Red design introduces a portal and new

loosely coupled services to accelerate federation with new partners, adoption of cloud services and emergence of personal cloud. The service suite, which is user accessible via SAML browser based front channel becomes: logon, assertion, consent, and the user's account dashboard.



#### ..it's built but will they come? ..



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Statistics pre- RealMe launch	(July 2013)
Total logons	6M
Total logon citizen 'accounts' Total igovtIDs created	1.5m (30% of population) 0.37m
Govt agencies connected	14/43 services (40% central agencies) doing 14.8m transactions to date

### 'Still in the leading bunch – more to do' ...personal observations.. Do you agree?

#### ..the good

- NZ Post
- Early policy baselines 2002 and 2009, & 'Better Govt' policy 2012
- Supporting legislation
- Future-proofed privacy & SOA architecture patterns
- PR 'wins', such as online passport renewal
- Some signs of private sector engagement
- We're up and going!

#### ..improvement areas

- NZ Post
- Macro-economic/digital economy policy 'lumpy'
- Governance with expert support
- 'iGovt Logon only' policy drives password resets
- Newer lighter protocols OAuth, OpenID, JSON
- Mobile Authn/optimisation
- Organisation and device identity
- User centric/personal data notions
- Most of all culture, mindset and attitude