Kantara Initiative eGovernment Implementation Profile of SAML V2.0

Version 2.0

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Abstract:
This document contains an implementation profile for eGovernment use of SAML V2.0, suitable for the purposes of testing conformance of implementations of SAML V2.0. It is not a deployment profile, and does not provide for or reflect specific behavior expected of implementations when used within a particular deployment context.

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1 Introduction

SAML V2.0 is a rich and extensible standard that must be profiled to be used interoperably, and the profiles that typically emerge from the broader standardization process usually remain fairly broad and include a number of options and features that increase the burden for implementers and make deployment-time decisions more difficult.

The Kantara Initiative eGovernment Implementation Profile provides a SAML V2.0 conformance specification for Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations operating in eGovernment federations and deployments. The profile is based on the SAML V2.0 specifications created by the Security Services Technical Committee (SSTC) of OASIS, and related specifications approved by that body. It constrains and supplements the base SAML V2.0 features, elements, and attributes required for eGovernment federations and deployments.

Implementation profiles define the features that software implementations must support such that deployers can be assured of the ability to meet their own (possibly varied) deployment requirements. Deployment profiles define specific options and constraints to which deployments are required to conform; they guide product configuration and federation operations, and provide criteria against which actual deployments may be tested. This document does not include a deployment profile, but reflects the features deemed necessary or desirable from software implementations in support of a variety of deployment profiles planned and in use. This includes requirements deemed useful to further the eventual goal of interfederation between deployments.

1.1 Notation

This specification uses normative text to describe the use of SAML capabilities.

The keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this specification are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119]:

> …they MUST only be used where it is actually required for interoperation or to limit behavior which has potential for causing harm (e.g., limiting retransmissions)…

These keywords are thus capitalized when used to unambiguously specify requirements over protocol and application features and behavior that affect the interoperability and security of implementations. When these words are not capitalized, they are meant in their natural-language sense.

```
Listings of XML schemas appear like this.
```

```
Example code listings appear like this.
```

Conventional XML namespace prefixes are used throughout the listings in this specification to stand for their respective namespaces as follows, whether or not a namespace declaration is present in the example:

- The prefix `saml2:` stands for the SAML 2.0 assertion namespace, `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion`
- The prefix `saml2p:` stands for the SAML 2.0 protocol namespace, `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol`
- The prefix `md:` stands for the SAML 2.0 metadata namespace, `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata`
- The prefix `idpdisc:` stands for the Identity Provider Discovery Service Protocol and Profile [IdPDisco] namespace, `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:profiles:SSO:idp-discovery-protocol`

- The prefix `mdattr:` stands for the Metadata Extension for Entity Attributes Version 1.0 [MetaAttr] namespace, `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:metadata:attribute`

This specification uses the following typographical conventions in text: `<ns:Element>`, `Attribute`, **Datatype**, `OtherCode`.

1.2 Normative References

[RFC2119] IETF RFC 2119, *Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels*, March 1997. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt

[RFC2616] IETF RFC 2616, *Hypertext Transfer Protocol – HTTP/1.1*, June 1999. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt

[RFC2818] IETF RFC 2818, *HTTP Over TLS*, May 2000. http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt

[HoKSSO] OASIS Committee Specification, *SAML V2.0 Holder-of-Key Web Browser SSO Profile Version 1.0*, ~~August~~July 2009. ~~http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-metadata-iop.pdf~~http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-holder-of-key-browser-sso-cs-01.pdf

[IdPDisco] OASIS Committee Specification, *Identity Provider Discovery Service Protocol and Profile*, March 2008. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-idp-discovery.pdf

[MetaAttr] OASIS Committee Specification, *SAML V2.0 Metadata Extension for Entity Attributes Version 1.0*, August 2009. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-metadata-attr.pdf

[MetaIOP] OASIS Committee Specification, *SAML V2.0 Metadata Interoperability Profile Version 1.0*, August 2009. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-metadata-iop.pdf

[SAML2Core] OASIS Standard, *Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0*, March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf

[SAML2Meta] OASIS Standard, *Metadata for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0*, March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-metadata-2.0-os.pdf

[SAML2Bind] OASIS Standard, *Bindings for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0*, March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-bindings-2.0-os.pdf

[SAML2Prof] OASIS Standard, *Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) V2.0*, March 2005. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf

[SAML2Err] OASIS Approved Errata, *SAML V2.0 Errata*. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/sstc-saml-approved-errata-2.0.pdf

[SAML-X500] OASIS Committee Specification, *SAML V2.0 X.500/LDAP Attribute Profile*, March 2008. http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-attribute-x500.pdf

Non-Normative References

[eGov15] Kyle Meadors, *Liberty Alliance eGov Profile for SAML 2.0 Version 1.5*.

2 SAML V2.0 Implementation Profile

This profile specifies behavior and options that implementations of a selected set of SAML V2.0 profiles [SAML2Prof] are required to support. The requirements specified are *in addition to* all normative requirements of the original profiles, as modified by the Approved Errata [SAML2Err], and readers should be familiar with all relevant reference documents. Any such requirements are not repeated here except where deemed necessary to highlight a point of discussion or draw attention to an issue addressed in errata, but remain implied.

SAML leaves substantial latitude to implementations with regard to how software is architected and combined with authentication and application infrastructure. Where the terms "Identity Provider" and "Service Provider" are used, they should be understood to include the total software footprint intended to provided the desired functionality; no specific assumptions are made as to how the required features are exposed to deployers, only that there is some method for doing so.

2.1 Required Information

Identification: TBD

Contact information: TBD

Description: Given below

Updates: Liberty Alliance eGov Profile for SAML 2.0 [eGov15]

2.2 Metadata and Trust Management

Identity Provider, Service Provider, and Discovery Service implementations MUST support the use of SAML V2.0 Metadata [SAML2Meta] in conjunction with their support of the SAML V2.0 profiles referenced by subsequent sections. Additional expectations around the use of particular metadata elements related to profile behavior may be encountered in those sections.

Implementations MUST support the SAML V2.0 Metadata Interoperability Profile Version 1.0 [MetaIOP].

Implementations MUST support the **TBD: insert profile for PKI here**

It is OPTIONAL for implementations to support the generation~~, publication,~~ or exportation of metadata, but implementations MUST support the publication of metadata using the Well-Known-Location method defined in section 4.1 of [SAML2Meta] (under the assumption that entityID values used are suitable for such support).

~~i~~Implementations MUST support the following mechanisms for the importation of metadata:

- local file
- remote resource at fixed location accessible via HTTP 1.1 [RFC2616] or HTTP 1.1 over TLS/SSL [RFC2818]

In the case of HTTP resolution, implementations MUST support use of the "ETag" header for cache management; other cache control support is OPTIONAL. Implementations SHOULD support the use of more than one fixed location for the importation of metadata, but MAY leave their behavior unspecified if a single entity's metadata is present in more than one source.

In accordance with [MetaIOP], importation of multiple entities' metadata contained within an `<md:EntitiesDescriptor>` element MUST be supported.

Verification of metadata, if supported, MUST include XML signature verification at least at the root element level, and SHOULD support the following mechanisms for signature key trust establishment:

- direct comparison against known keys
- some form of path-based certificate validation against one or more trusted root certificates and certificate revocation lists

The latter mechanism does not impose a particular profile for certificate validation, as no such profile has wide enough adoption across tools and libraries to warrant such a requirement, but should be understood as being consistent with the "usual" practices encountered in the implementation of certificate validation. Where possible, implementations SHOULD document known limitations of the mechanisms they employ.

Implementations SHOULD support the SAML V2.0 Metadata Extension for Entity Attributes Version 1.0 [MetaAttr] and provide policy controls on the basis of SAML attributes supplied via this extension mechanism.

Finally, implementations SHOULD allow for the automated updating/reimportation of metadata without significant disruption of services.

2.2.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.3 Name Identifiers

In conjunction with their support of the SAML V2.0 profiles referenced by subsequent sections, Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the following SAML V2.0 name identifier formats, in accordance with the normative obligations associated with them by [SAML2Core]:

- `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:persistent`
- `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:nameid-format:transient`

Support for other formats is OPTIONAL.

2.3.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.4 Attributes

In conjunction with their support of the SAML V2.0 profiles referenced by subsequent sections, Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the generation and consumption of `<saml2:Attribute>` elements that conform to the SAML V2.0 X.500/LDAP Attribute Profile [SAML-X500].

The ability to support `<saml2:AttributeValue>` elements whose values are not simple strings (e.g., `<saml2:NameID>`, or other XML values) is OPTIONAL. Such content could be base64-encoded as an alternative.

2.4.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.5 Browser Single Sign-On

This section defines an implementation profile of the SAML V2.0 Web Browser SSO ~~p~~Profile [SAML2Prof].

2.5.1 Identity Provider Discovery

Service Provider and Discovery Service implementations MUST support the Identity Provider Discovery Service Protocol Profile in conformance with section 2.4.1 of [IdPDisco].

2.5.1.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.5.2 Authentication Requests

2.5.2.1 Binding and Security Requirements

Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the use of the HTTP-Redirect binding [SAML2Bind] for the transmission of `<saml2p:AuthnRequest>` messages, including the generation or verification of signatures in conjunction with this binding.

Support for other bindings is OPTIONAL.

2.5.2.1.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.5.2.2 Message Content

In addition to standard core- and profile-driven requirements, Service Provider implementations MUST support the inclusion of at least the following `<saml2p:AuthnRequest>` child elements and attributes (when appropriate):

- `AssertionConsumerServiceURL`
- `ProtocolBinding`
- `ForceAuthn`
- `IsPassive`
- `AttributeConsumingServiceIndex`
- `<saml2p:RequestedAuthnContext>`
- `<saml2p:NameIDPolicy>`

Identity Provider implementations MUST support all `<saml2p:AuthnRequest>` child elements and attributes defined by [SAML2Core], but MAY provide that support in the form of returning appropriate errors when confronted by particular request options. However, implementations MUST fully support the options enumerated above.

Implementations MAY limit their support of the `<saml2p:RequestedAuthnContext>` element to the value "exact" for the `Comparison` attribute.

2.5.2.2.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.5.3 Responses

2.5.3.1 Binding and Security Requirements

Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the use of the HTTP-POST and HTTP-Artifact bindings [SAML2Bind] for the transmission of `<saml2p:Response>` messages.

Support for other bindings, and for artifact types other than `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:artifact-04`, is OPTIONAL.

Identity Provider~~s~~ and Service Provider~~s~~ implementations MUST support the generation and consumption of unsolicited `<saml2p:Response>` messages (i.e., responses that are not the result of a `<saml2p:AuthnRequest>` message).

Identity Provider implementations MUST support the issuance of `<saml2p:Response>` messages (with appropriate status codes) in the course of encountering error conditions, provided that the user agent remains available and the location to deliver the response is knowable. Note that this is a stronger requirement than the comparable language in [SAML2Prof].

Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the signing of `<saml2:Assertion>` elements in responses; support for signing of the `<saml2p:Response>` element is OPTIONAL.

Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the use of XML Encryption via the `<saml2:EncryptedAssertion>` element when using the HTTP-POST binding; support for the `<saml2:EncryptedID>` and `<saml2:EncryptedAttribute>` elements is OPTIONAL.

2.5.3.1.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.5.3.2 Message Content

The Web Browser SSO Profile allows responses to contain any number of assertions and statements. Identity Provider implementations MUST allow the number of `<saml2:Assertion>`, `<saml2:AuthnStatement>`, and `<saml2:AttributeStatement>` elements in the `<saml2p:Response>` message to be limited to one.

In turn, Service Provider implementations MAY limit support to a single instance of those elements when processing `<saml2p:Response>` messages.

Identity Provider implementations MUST support the inclusion of a `Consent` attribute in `<saml2p:Response>` messages, and a `SessionIndex` attribute in `<saml2:AuthnStatement>` elements.

Service Provider implementations that provide some form of session semantics MUST support the `<saml2:AuthnStatement>` element's `SessionNotOnOrAfter` attribute.

2.5.3.2.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.5.4 Artifact Resolution

Pursuant to the requirement in section 2.5.3.1 for support of the HTTP-Artifact binding [SAML2Bind] for the transmission of `<saml2p:Response>` messages, implementations MUST support ~~t~~ the SAML V2.0 Artifact Resolution profile [SAML2Prof]~~.~~ as constrained by the following subsections.

2.5.4.1 Artifact Resolution Requests

Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the use of the SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) binding [SAML2Bind]~~, using HTTP as a transport,~~ for the transmission of `<saml2p:ArtifactResolve>` messages.

~~Implementations MUST support the use of SAML message signatures to authenticate requests; support for TLS or other transport-based authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding is OPTIONAL.~~Implementations MUST support the use of SAML message signatures and TLS server authentication to authenticate requests; support for TLS client authentication, or other forms of authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding, is OPTIONAL.

2.5.4.1.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.5.4.2 Artifact Resolution Responses

Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the use of the SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) binding [SAML2Bind]~~, using HTTP as a transport,~~ for the transmission of `<saml2p:ArtifactResponse>` messages.

~~Implementations MUST support the use of SAML message signatures to authenticate requests; support for TLS or other transport-based authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding is OPTIONAL.~~Implementations MUST support the use of SAML message signatures and TLS server authentication to authenticate responses; support for TLS client authentication, or other forms of authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding, is OPTIONAL.

2.5.4.2.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.6 Browser Holder of Key Single Sign-On

This section defines an implementation profile of the SAML V2.0 Holder-of-Key Web Browser SSO Profile Version 1.0 [HoKSSO].

The implementation requirements defined in section 2.5 for the non-holder-of-key profile apply to implementations of this profile.

2.6.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.7 Single Logout

This section defines an implementation profile of the SAML V2.0 Single Logout ~~p~~Profile [SAML2Prof].

For clarification, the technical requirements for each message type below reflect the intent to normatively require initiation of logout by a Service Provider using either the front- or back-channel, and initiation/propagation of logout by an Identity Provider using the back-channel.

2.7.1 Logout Requests

2.7.1.1 Binding and Security Requirements

Identity Provider ~~and Service Provider~~ implementations MUST support the ~~HTTP-Redirect and use of the~~ SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) binding~~s~~ [SAML2Bind] for the ~~transmission~~issuance ~~-~~of `<saml2p:LogoutRequest>` messages~~, including the generation or verification of message signatures in conjunction with both bindings~~, and MUST ~~-~~support the SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) and HTTP-Redirect bindings [SAML2Bind] for the reception of `<saml2p:LogoutRequest>` messages.

Service Provider implementations MUST support the SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) binding [SAML2Bind] for both issuance and reception of `<saml2p:LogoutRequest>` messages.

Support for other bindings is OPTIONAL.

Implementations MUST support the use of SAML message signatures and TLS server authentication to authenticate requests; support for TLS client authentication, or other forms of authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding, is OPTIONAL.

~~Support for other bindings is OPTIONAL.~~

~~Support for TLS or other transport-based authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding is OPTIONAL.~~

~~-~~Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the use of XML Encryption via the `<saml2:EncryptedID>` element when using the HTTP-Redirect binding.

2.7.1.1.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.7.1.2 User Interface Behavior

Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support "local" logout as well as initiation of Single Logout, subject to deployer and user option.

2.7.1.2.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

2.7.2 Logout Responses

2.7.2.1 Binding and Security Requirements

Identity Provider implementations MUST support the SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) and HTTP-Redirect bindings [SAML2Bind] for the issuance of `<saml2p:LogoutResponse>` messages, and MUST support the SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) binding [SAML2Bind] for the reception of `<saml2p:LogoutResponse>` messages.

Service Provider implementations MUST support the SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) binding [SAML2Bind] for both issuance and reception of `<saml2p:LogoutResponse>` messages.

Support for other bindings is OPTIONAL.

Implementations MUST support the use of SAML message signatures and TLS server authentication to authenticate responses; support for TLS client authentication, or other forms of authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding, is OPTIONAL.~~Identity Provider and Service Provider implementations MUST support the use of the HTTP-Redirect and SAML SOAP (using HTTP as a transport) bindings [SAML2Bind] for the transmission of `<saml2p:LogoutResponse>` messages, including the generation or verification of message signatures in conjunction with both bindings. Support for TLS or other transport-based authentication in conjunction with the SAML SOAP binding is OPTIONAL.~~

~~Support for other bindings is OPTIONAL.~~

2.7.2.1.1 Conformance Criteria

TBD

3 Conformance Classes

3.1 Standard

Conforming Identity Provider and/or Service Provider implementations MUST support the normative requirements in sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.

3.2 Standard with Logout

Conforming Identity Provider and/or Service Provider implementations MUST support the normative requirements in sections 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7.

3.3 Full

Conforming Identity Provider and/or Service Provider implementations MUST support all normative requirements in section 2.

Appendix A. Open Issues

- Need an alternative to IOP, or agreement to drop PKI outside of metadata exchange. Alternative needs to specify PKI to some degree AND address the exact content and semantics of metadata as relates to runtime certificate evaluation and/or identity of SAML peer.
- ~~Security features required in support of SOAP binding? Client signing, server signing + TLS~~
- Do implementations need to be able to prevent non-use of TLS on front-channel?
- Need for more than exact AuthnContext matching?
- Need for specific MTI behavior on ACS checking?
- Need some clarification of some of the original single logout language around user consent.
- Updated crypto algorithm conformance rules for implementers and deployers?
- Populate with conformance criteria.
- Is feature discussion of AuthnContext and metadata tagging enough to cover LOA issues?
- ~~Add metadata publication requirement...~~
- IdP proxying
- ~~Mandating Responses from IdP during SSO?~~Need to bump HoK reference to new profile version once it reaches CS.

Appendix B. Change Log

- Draft 01: first working draft based on similar document created by InCommon ~~f~~Federation
- Draft 02: first round of feedback incorporated, deployment section dropped, new section on Artifact Resolution added, artifact added for SSO responses, SOAP added for logout, discovery moved under SSO, language on non-string attributes added, changed SHOULD to MUST for IdP support of selected AuthnRequest features
- Draft 03: moved Artifact Resolution into a SSO profile subsection, new language on SOAP security and SLO bindings, added metadata publication via WKL, added language on IdP error handling, added Holder of Key SSO profile, added Conformance Classes