



# User-Managed Access (UMA) 101

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@xmlgrrl | @UMAWG | [tinyurl.com/umawg](http://tinyurl.com/umawg)

IIWXXVIII | 30 Apr 2019



# Topics

- Overview
- UMA in action
- The technical big picture
- The UMA grant
- Federated authorization
- Authorization assessment
- Privacy and business-legal-technical implications


# Overview

What UMA adds to OAuth

# OAuth enables constrained delegation of access to apps

## Benefits:


- Flexible, clever API security **framework**
- Alice can **agree** to app connections and also **revoke** them



# OpenID Connect does modern-day federation

## Benefits:

- **Layers** identity/ authentication tech with delegation/ authorization tech
- **Translates** federated identity for mobile and the API economy



# To OAuth, UMA adds cross-party sharing...



Resource owner




Requesting party



Client

## Benefits:

- **Secure** delegation
- Alice **can be absent** when Bob attempts access
- Helpful **error handling** for client applications



# ...in a wide ecosystem...



Resource owner

## Benefits:

- Alice **controls trust** between a service that hosts her resources and a service that authorizes access to them



Requesting party



Client



Authorization server



Resource server



# ...of resource hosts



Resource owner




Requesting party



Client


## Benefits:

- Resource hosts can **outsource authorization** management – and liability – to a specialist service
- Alice can **manage sharing** at a centralizable service
- Bob can **revoke his access** to *Alice's* resources





# UMA user experience opportunities




# Benefits for service providers: a summary


True secure delegation; no password sharing




Scale permissioning through self-service



API-first protection strategy




Foster compliance through standards




# Benefits for individuals: a summary


Choice in sharing with other parties




Convenient sharing/approval with no outside influence



Centralizable monitoring and management



Control of who/what/how at a fine grain



# Typical use cases

- Alice to Bob (person to person):
  - Patient-directed health data/device sharing
  - Discovering/aggregating pension accounts and sharing access to financial advisors
  - Connected car data and car sharing
- Enterprise to Alice (initial RO is an organization):
  - Enterprise API access management
  - Access delegation between employees
- Alice to Alice (person to self/app):
  - Proactive policy-based control of app connections
- Profiled or referenced by:
  - OpenID Foundation HEART Working Group
  - UK Department for Work and Pensions
  - OpenMedReady Alliance

# Known implementations

(more detail at [tinyurl.com/umawg](http://tinyurl.com/umawg))

- ForgeRock – financial, healthcare, IoT, G2C...
- Gluu (open source) – API protection, enterprise, G2C...
- ShareMedData – healthcare
- HIE of One / Trustee (open source) – healthcare
- IDENTOS – healthcare, G2C
- Pauldron (open source) – healthcare
- RedHat Keycloak (open source) – API protection, enterprise, IoT...
- WSO2 (open source) – enterprise...

# UMA in a nutshell

- Developed at **Kantara Initiative**
  - V1 done in 2015, V2 done in 2018
- Leverages existing **open standards**
  - OAuth2
  - OpenID Connect and SAML (optional but popular)
- Specs **contributed** to IETF OAuth WG in Feb
- Profiled by multiple **industry sectors**
  - Financial, healthcare
- UMA business model effort supports **legal licensing** for personal digital assets
  - Example: Mother (guardian) manages sharing for child (data subject); child “ages in” to consent and starts to manage sharing herself
- Some **1:1 interop testing** done; more soon?



# UMA in action

A couple of sample implementations

# Lush Group

HealthyMePHR – also ShareMedData

A screenshot of a web interface for patient authorization. At the top, it says "I, Alice Patient, authorize". Below that, it shows "To disclose my information to" with two dropdown menus: "HealthyMePHR" and "Dr. Erica, Lush Medical". The main section is titled "Medical Information" and asks "Select how you would like to share your medical information". There are two radio button options: "SHARE ALL information in my medical Record" (which is selected) and "SHARE SPECIFIC medical data sets". Below this is the "Consent Term" section, which says "Enter a start and end date during which your medical data will be shared". It has two input fields: "Consent Start" with the value "31 May 2017" and "Consent End" with the value "31 December 2019". At the bottom, there are four buttons: "CANCEL", "SAVE", "SHARE" (highlighted in blue), and "REVOKE".

- Patient Alice creates a policy to share with Dr. Erica, she selects her sharing preferences, and presses SHARE


SHARE

- Patient sharing is easy!
  - See [HEART webinar recording from 23 Apr 2019](#)



# ForgeRock Identity Platform

Profile and Privacy Management Dashboard – also Access Management module




**ROCK 'N' ROLL SUPERMARKET** Shop Coupons Recipes 


**MY ACCOUNT**

- Personal Info
- Sign-in & Security
- Preferences
- Trusted Devices
- Authorized Apps
- Privacy & Consent
- Sharing**
- Activity
- Account Controls

## Sharing

Manage your shared resources.

	Party Food Shopping List	Shared with 2 people
	Shopping List	Not shared
	Oliver's Bday Wish List	Shared with 2 people





**ROCK 'N' ROLL SUPERMARKET** Shop Coupons Recipes 

**MY ACCOUNT**

- Personal Info
- Sign-in & Security
- Preferences
- Trusted Devices
- Authorized Apps
- Privacy & Consent
- Sharing
- Activity**
- Account Controls

## Activity

Account actions you've taken in the last 28 days.


	Party Food Shopping List You updated sharing	9 hours ago
	Party Food Shopping List ed.enduser@example.com viewed	1 day ago
	Oliver's Bday Wishlist You allowed access to ed.enduser@example.com	1 day ago
	Oliver's Bday Wishlist edna.enduser@example.com shared	July 2, 2017

# The technical big picture

A technical summary of the two UMA 2.0 specifications and their tokens

# The marvelous spiral of delegated sharing, squared


1. The **UMA grant of OAuth** enables Alice-to-Bob delegation
2. **UMA standardized an API for federated authorization** at the AS to make it centralizable
3. There are **nicknames** for enhanced and new tokens to keep them straight



# The UMA extension grant adds...

[docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/rec-oauth-uma-grant-2.0.html](https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/rec-oauth-uma-grant-2.0.html)


- **Party-to-party:** Resource owner authorizes protected-resource access to clients used by requesting parties
- **Asynchronous:** Resource owner interactions are asynchronous with respect to the authorization grant
- **Policies:** Resource owner can configure an AS with rules (policy conditions) for the grant of access, vs. just authorize/deny
  - Such configurations are outside UMA's scope



# UMA federated authorization adds...

[docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/rec-oauth-uma-federated-authz-2.0.html](https://docs.kantarainitiative.org/uma/wg/rec-oauth-uma-federated-authz-2.0.html)

- **1-to-n:** Multiple RS's in different domains can use an AS in another domain
  - “Protection API” automates resource protection
  - Enables resource owner to monitor and control grant rules from one place
- **Scope-grained control:** Grants can increase/decrease by resource and scope
- **Resources and scopes:** RS registers resource details at the AS to manage their protection



# The UMA grant

A walkthrough of the UMA extension grant of OAuth2 and permission tickets

# The UMA extension grant flow and its options

The AS is acting as an **agent** for an absent RO

The client's first resource request is **tokenless**


The RS provides a **permission ticket** and allows **AS discovery**

There are two **claims collection options** for meeting policy

Authorization assessment and token issuance has **guardrails**

RPTs can be **upgraded, revoked, introspected, and refreshed**

UMA2 grant basics



# The permission ticket: how you *start* building a bridge of trust

- **Binds client, RS, and AS:** Every entity may be **loosely coupled**; the whole flow needs to be bound
  - It's like an overarching state parameter or “ticket-getting ticket”
  - Or maybe even a bit like an authorization code
- **Refreshed for security:** The client can **retry** RPT requests after non-fatal AS errors, using either claims collection option of the grant flow
  - The AS **refreshes** the permission ticket when responding with such errors



# Pushed claims scenario: for wide-ish ecosystems


The AS is the requesting party's IdP and the client is the RP

More detail on the RS's initial response to the client

The client pushes its existing ID token to the token endpoint

The AS is in the primary audience for this token

Somewhat resembles SSO or the OAuth assertion grant, where a token of expected type and contents is "turned in"



# Interactive claims gathering scenario: for wide ecosystems

(eliding detail already seen)

A claims interaction endpoint **must have been declared** in the discovery document to allow this flow


The AS mediates gathering of **claims from any source**

A key “metaclaim” to think about: **consent to persist claims**

A PCT potentially enables a **better RqP experience** next time; the AS can then re-assess using claims on hand

Resembles the **authorization code grant**, but can apply to non-unique identities and is repeatable and “buildable”

## Gather claims interactively



# Federated authorization

A walkthrough of UMA federated authorization and its protection API

# A new perspective on the UMA grant


How does the AS know when to **start protecting resources**?

How does the RS know what **ticket** the AS is associating with the RS's recommended **permissions**?

Is there anything special about **token introspection**?


Let's **standardize an interface** at the AS for these jobs

## Federated authorization perspective



# The protection API: how you *federate* authorization

- **RS registers resources:** This is required for an AS to be “on the job”
  - Scopes can differ per resource
  - Resource and scope metadata assist with policy setting interfaces
- **RS chooses permissions:** The RS **interprets** the client’s tokenless resource request and **requests** permissions from the AS
  - The AS then issues the initial permission ticket
- **RS can introspect the RPT:** UMA **enhances** the token introspection response object
- **RO controls AS-RS trust:** The protection API is **OAuth-protected**
  - The resource owner authorizes the scope **uma\_protection**
  - The issued token is called the **PAT**




# The resource registration endpoint

Registering a resource **puts it under protection**

Setting policies can be done **anytime after creation**

Deregistering a resource **removes it from protection**

### UMA Federated Authorization Resource Registration Endpoint



# Resource and scope registration

- The RS is authoritative for what its resource boundaries are
  - It registers them as JSON-based descriptions
  - There is a resource “type” parameter
- Scopes can be simple strings or URIs that point to description documents

## Create request:

```
POST /rreg/ HTTP/1.1 Content-Type: application/json
Authorization: Bearer MHg3OUZEQkZBMjcx
...
{
  "resource_scopes": [
    "patient/*.read"
  ],
  "icon_uri": "http://www.example.com/icons/device23",
  "name": "Awesome Medical Device Model 23",
  "type": "https://www.hl7.org/fhir/observation.html"
}
```

## Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Content-Type: application/json
Location: /rreg/rsrcl
...
{
  "_id": "rsrcl"
}
```


# The permission endpoint

The RS **interprets** the client's tokenless (or insufficient-token) resource request

The RS must be able to tell from the client's request context **which RO and AS were meant**

```
Request:  
POST /perm/ HTTP/1.1  
Content-Type: application/json  
Host: as.example.com  
Authorization: Bearer MHg3OUZEQkZBMjcx  
...  
{  
  "resource_id": "rsrc1",  
  "resource_scopes": [  
    "patient/*.read"  
  ]  
}
```

## UMA Federated Authorization Permission Endpoint



```
Response:  
HTTP/1.1 201 Created  
Content-Type: application/json  
...  
{  
  "Ticket": "016f84e8-f9b9-11e0-bd6f-0021cc6004de"  
}
```



# The token introspection endpoint

UMA **enhances** the token introspection response object

A **permissions claim** is added, with resource ID-bound scopes


## Response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json
Cache-Control: no-store
...
{
  "active": true,
  "exp": 1256953732,
  "iat": 1256912345,
  "permissions": [
    {
      "resource_id": "rsrcl",
      "resource_scopes": [
        "patient/*.read"
      ],
      "exp": 1256953732
    }
  ]
}
```

## Request:

```
POST /introspect HTTP/1.1
Host: as.example.com
Authorization: Bearer MHg3OUZEQkZBMjcx
...
token=mF_9.B5f-4.1JqM
```

## UMA Federated Authorization Token Introspection Endpoint




# Authorization assessment

The UMA guardrails around issuing permissions

# Authorization assessment: how the AS adheres to the RO's wishes in the larger context

The client can request scopes at the token endpoint, but must have **pre-registered** them with the AS for it to work

The AS treats the scopes in this intersection as matching **any available scope** associated with a resource in the ticket



Permissions associated with the ticket can **add** to total requested scopes

If authorization assessment results in only a subset of client-desired scopes, the AS can **choose to error**


# Privacy and “BLT” implications

The bigger business-legal-technical picture

# Relevance for privacy beyond “empowered flows”

- Features relevant to privacy regulations (GDPR, CCPA, OB, PSD2, CDR, HHS ONC info blocking rules...):
  - Asynchronous resource owner control of grants
  - Enabling resource owner to monitor and manage grants from a “dashboard”
  - Auditability of grants (consent) and PAT-authorized AS-RS interactions
- Work is well along on an UMA business model
  - Modeling real-life data-sharing relationships and legal devices
  - Technical artifacts are mapped to devices
  - Goal: tear down artifacts and build up new ones in response to state changes

# (Most) legal relationships in the business model



# UMA implications...

## ...for the client

- Simpler next-step handling at every point

## ...for the RS

- Standardize management of protected resources

## ...for the RO

- Control data sharing/device control
- Truly delegate access to other parties using clients

## ...for the AS

- Offer interoperable authorization services
- Don't have to touch data to protect it

## ...for the RqP

- Seek access to a protected resource as oneself

## ...for the client operator

- Distinguish identities of resource owners from mere users

## ...for the resource server operator

- Externalize authorization while still owning API/scopes

## ...for the resource rights admin

- Manage sharing on behalf of data subjects, not just for oneself

## ...for the authorization server operator

- Prove what interactions took place or didn't

## ...for the requesting agent

- Revoke access (or request it) to someone else's assets



Join us!  
Thank you!  
Questions?

Eve Maler, Kantara Initiative UMA Work Group chair

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