Abstract
This document is a non-normative set of auxiliary material produced by the User-Managed Access Work Group. It provides advice to, and discussions relevant to, developers and deployers of UMA-enabled software systems, services, and applications.
Status
This document is currently under active developmentwill have material added to it as warranted. It focuses primarily on UMA V2.0, which is currently at the WG draft stage; every attempt will be made to mark content that applies to specific versions.
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Copyright: The content of this document is copyright of Kantara Initiative. © 2017 2018 Kantara Initiative
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Table of Contents
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This document uses terms and abbreviations defined in the UMA V2.0 (currently in draft) Core and OAuth Resource Registration specifications, and presumes understanding of UMA conceptsspecifications, and presumes understanding of UMA concepts.
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When the requesting party is redirected to the authorization server for interactive claims gathering, a man in the middle/man in the browser can manipulate messages, impacting the claims_redirect_uri parameter (in what is called the Mix-Up attack in the case of a OAuth security analysis) and potentially more elements of the front-channel messages involved. The claims_redirect_uri parameter is similar to the OAuth redirect_uri parameter and some attacks may be able to be mitigated through approaches described in the OAuth Security Topics Internet-Draft (at revision 04 at the time of writing), Section 4.4. If the syntactic mitigation approach described is taken, the authorization server's redirection response back to the client would need to be extended with additional parameters as described in the OAuth 2.0 Mix-Up Mitigation Internet-Draft (at revision 01 at the time of writing). If the client-side mitigation approach described is taken, the client would have to perform a number of coordinating and tracking actions in addition to choosing authorization server-specific URLs. The client could additionally use the state parameter and choose a specific type of value that carries enough application state to enable it to match the value with its callback.
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Since there is a many-to-one relationship between API calls and the scopes they map to, the RS resource server can distinguish the desired scope from the client's access attempt and request it that scope if it sees fit.
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This is a good example of where the client would want to exercise its option to pre-register for and then dynamically request admin scope if the requesting party’s immediate need were only for the two actions also available within user scope. It’s also a good example of where the RS resource server would potentially want to have a strategy of "parsimonious" rather than "generous" permission requests (either requesting user scope rather than admin scope and not requesting additional resource identifiers, or even requesting no scopes at all and let the client take on the burden of expressing its needs).
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A GET call doesn’t distinguish between the two possible functions. The RS resource server can request zero scopes, which may be the wisest choice for (say) a paid service or just in the name of least privilege and minimal disclosure.
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Assume the same example as above. Because the ROresource owner-RS resource server interface is private (beyond the issuance of the PAT), and the details of which resources are centrally protected and how are allowed to be variable, the resource server could make an option available to the resource owner to keep the the download scope "private" – that is, never registered for any of the ROresource owner's resources (meaning, never advertised by the RS resource server as part of the universe of possible scopes on this resource).
In this scenario, the RS resource server should first look at the ROresource owner-designated scopes before requesting permissions.
This would mean that the AS authorization server would fail the client with an invalid_scope error at the token endpoint if the client requested it (and presumably pre-registered for it). The RSresource server, too, would receive an invalid_scope error if it tried to request a permission it hadn't first registered as part of a resource.
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If the RS resource server can't get a permission ticket, it issues a 403 Forbidden HTTP error and Warning: 199 - "UMA Authorization Server Unreachable". One reason for being unable to get a permission ticket is that the resource owner's PAT has expired or is otherwise invalid, and it has no way of refreshing the PAT. In this case, the RS resource server could take this opportunity to initiate some refreshing action such as send a notification to the resource owner and ask them to re-consent to the pairing with the AS authorization server as required.
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- The resource server treats a "wildcarded" URI as being a single complex resource for authorization server purposes; this translates to individual registration.
- To enable a human resource owner to share out resources one at a time using a Share button, the resource server would probably need individual registration at stage 2. But to enable "relationship-driven sharing" of (say) multiple smart device resources at once, the resource server might want to register as many resources as are available in a household. For industrial IoT use cases, the number of resources to register could climb
- In discussions about the FHIR API for healthcare, resource registrations might "pair" with patterns of permission requests that anticipate a need for the requesting side to gain access to certain clusters of resources, say, three related resources if ever a client attempts to access one of them. (E.g., each of the use cases in the GDoc imagining RS resource server permission requests for various APIs gives us a way of imagining finite numbers.)
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(This section is specific to UMA V1.0.1.)
Any entity receiving or retrieving a JSON data structure is supposed to ignore extension properties it is unable to understand, and manage property namespaces on its own to avoid collisions. Properties defined in the specifications that are optional to supply, however, are nonetheless required to be handled by the receiving entity.
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| Property (V1.0.1 references) | Recommendations |
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| Core Sec 1.4: Authorization server configuration data | |
| claim_token_profiles_supported | Provided as a hint; no significant impact if ignored by any party. Should be logged if ignored to help with troubleshooting. |
| uma_profiles_supported | Provided as a hint; no significant impact if ignored by any party. Should be logged if ignored to help with troubleshooting. |
| dynamic_client_endpoint | Authorization Server: implementations should take care to provide this parameter if support for the dynamic client registration feature is provided. Failing to provide it (or providing it erroneously) can induce incorrect handling by clients or resource servers. Clients, Resource Servers: if the parameter is not provided, clients and resources servers must assume that dynamic client registration is not possible, and should therefore not attempt such registration. |
| requesting_party_claims_endpoint | Authorization Server: to avoid confusion, should provide this parameter if end-user RP claims gathering capability exists. |
| Core Sec 3.4.2: RPT "Bearer" profile | |
| exp | Authorization Server: since not providing this property implicitly means that the permission does not expire, the AS should take care only to ignore the parameter if a non-expiring permission is desired. It may be sensible to consider always providing a value, even if far in the future, to avoid inadvertently granting permanent permissions. |
| iat | Authorization Server: Not providing the issued-at time introduces the potential for confusion at the RS about whether the token is valid or not. Resource Server: RS should consider whether the issued-at time is reasonable (allowing for potential clock skew). Ignoring the parameter, if provided, could introduce a risk of incorrectly processing a 'bad' token. |
| nbf | Authorization Server: failure to provide this parameter might result in access to a resource being granted earlier than intended. The AS should consider providing a value to avoid any potential confusion. Resource Server: if the parameter is provided, it must be adhered to. If a value is not provided, the RS should assume 'now' as the nbf, and log accordingly for audit purposes. |
| Core Sec 3.5.4.2: Error Details About Claims | |
| name | Authorization Server: not providing a value might cause processing confusion later. The AS should consider providing this. Client: the client should consider using this value when returning any eventual results to the AS, in order to avoid confusion. |
| friendly_name | Authorization Server: no significant impact; although not providing a value means that the client will have to make assumptions about how to present the claim requirement to the user. Client: no significant impact; although the client should consider using this value to help provide improved communication to the user. |
| claim_type | Authorization Server: no significant impact. Client: no significant impact. |
| claim_token_format | Authorization Server: failing to provide this parameter might result in a token format being return that the AS cannot then process. AS should consider providing this parameter to avoid confusion at the Client. Client: if provided, client should take account of the acceptable token formats when it returns a token to the AS. Ignoring this parameter might result in a token being returned in a format which the AS cannot process. |
| issuer | Authorization Server: no significant impact. Client: ignoring this parameter, if provided, might result in a token being returned from an issuing authority which is not acceptable to the AS (and so lead to a poor user experience). |
| Core Sec 3.6.3: Client Redirects Requesting Party to Authorization Server for Claims-Gathering | |
| claims_redirect_uri | Authorization Server: it is recommended to include this parameter to avoid confusion or unexpected results at the AS. Client: ignoring this parameter is not recommended. |
| state | As noted in the spec, it is highly recommended that this parameter be included in order to avoid cross-site request forgery. |
| ticket (response) | There are no circumstances in which this parameter can reasonably be ignored. |
| state (response) | There are no circumstances in which this parameter can reasonably be ignored. |
| Core Sec 4.2: UMA error responses | |
| error_description | No significant impact. |
| error_uri | No significant impact. |
| RSR Sec 2.1: Scope descriptions | |
| icon_uri | Resource Server: no significant impact Authorization Server: should log that it is ignoring for troubleshooting purposes. |
| RSR Sec 2.2: Resource set descriptions | |
| uri | Resource Server: in many deployments, the network location for the resource set being registered will be provided by (or inferable from) the 'scope' parameter (which is required). If not, however, the resource server will most likely use the 'uri' parameter to provide the network location. Authorization Server: if the parameter is ignored, this should be logged for troubleshooting. It is unlikely to be ignored in most common scenarios. |
| type | Resource Server: this can be a helpful hint to provide to the AS. Authorization Server: should log that it is ignoring for troubleshooting purposes. |
| icon_uri | Resource Server: no significant impact. Authorization Server: should log that it is ignoring for troubleshooting purposes. |
| RSR Sec 3: Error messages | |
| error_description | Resource Server: no significant impact. Authorization Server: should log that it is ignoring for troubleshooting purposes. |
| error_uri | Resource Server: no significant impact. Authorization Server: should log that it is ignoring for troubleshooting purposes. |
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