Versions Compared

Key

  • This line was added.
  • This line was removed.
  • Formatting was changed.

...

NonVoting
Ken Dagg
Colin Soutar
Dan Combs
Bill Braithewaite
David Wasley
Helen Hill
Mark Lizar

Apologies:
Rich Furr
Richard Trevorah
Richard Wilsher
Rainer Hoerbe

Staff:
Joni Brennan
Anna Ticktin

...

  • Attribute Assurance : is this a track we want to undertake in Kantara? Where does this work belong? In IAWG or elsewhere?

David Wasley 3 axis:

...

  • the strength of binding of an identifier to a physical person;
  • the trustworthiness of information known about that person (attributes of identity);
  • the degree of privacy or lack thereof represents by various uses of the above.

For example, I could have a very reliable identifier (an abstract identifier on a smart with a biometric pin) but if very little is known about me then an Attribute Provider could only provide low assurance information.  In fact, the smartcard issuer might not even ask for personal information from me.  However, I might want to enter into a service agreement with one or more Attribute Providers that would then investigate and validate various "claims" I would like to be able to make to Relying Parties.  The third axis relates to how much information about me is actually given to a Relying Party.  This issue is independent of the other 2 axes but obviously giving away bogus information associated with a poorly bound identifier could be less problematic than the other extreme.

Here's a graphic I made several years ago to illustrate the concept: Image Added

  • Ken: Gov't of Canada has an interest in attribute assurance and validation(realtime and delayed)/verification around attributes.

...