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- Richard mentioned that NIST has effectively taken away AL2.
- Discussion of the fact that there are no mechanisms for validating drivers license, although AAMVA would like to be in that business.
- Right now the only viable implementations are PKI or self-assertion.
- Russ has had discussion with someone at GSA has looked into expanding passport service to support this, but they run into funding problems for this. Financial institutions will also have difficulty verifying those sources. Would not be surprised if there was an order of magnitude increase in costs - negotiating individual contracts with different states for drivers license validation would expand costs considerably, even if it was possible. Will probably result in stagnating the online credential business, unless GSA were to step in and provide those services on behalf of the government (along the lines of the ACES program).
- Ken mentions the concern from CSPs about the implementation roadmap for when the new changes will be required. Colin says discussions have not taken place, but NIST are aware of Kantara's view on that.
- Richard Wilsher points out that the enrollment processes of most CSPs would need to be changed to meet the new standard, that will not be rapid. Furthermore the question from Kantara's perspective - how soon would Kantara be able to perform assessments? Thirdly, what would Kantara do to set a deadline by which CSPs would be required to comply.
- Ken asks whether existing credentials would need to be re-proofed. Russ Weiser has mentioned that customers will be unhappy about that. Customers are already asking what to do about the standard. Something like that could result in a years of delay while credentials are updated.
- Richard inquires what will happen with the existing SAC aligned with 63-2 - would we continue it in parallel? Would there be an overlap? What about those who are not in the US who are approved against the current criteria
Reference: DRAFT IAWG Meeting Minutes 2017-03-02
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- Numerous references to "digital service" without being clear what they mean.
- Refer extensively to the "subscriber" whereas other schemes include "subscriber" and a "subject". The "subscriber" may be the organization who wants credentials issued to a number of subjects. Would make easier alignment with other sources.
- Model and state diagrams are inconsistently applied. When you become a subscriber because you have enrolled, the definition of enrollment doesn't include the definition of a service account. Since they are unclear on the enrollment process its not clear what the subscriber is.
- RGW suggests maybe this means that 800-63A should include the idea of enrollment and becoming a subscriber/subject. Overall, changing the term from subscriber to subject.
- Andrew is wrestling with the question of "are you still a subscriber when you are federating authentication?"
- Part of the model inconsistency is differences in how the verb "authenticate" is applied, does the subscriber authenticate or does the CSP do the authenticating.The documents are called "guidance" but it contains requirements. Are the contents mandatory or not?
- Andrew is reviewing and finding internal inconsistencies in the way terms are used, it's not clear what the state model is to get from non-authenticated to authenticate state, versus the authenticators and secrets and other things needed to assert the identifier. They do say that the purpose of authentication is to produce an identifier, versus the purpose is to get access to a service.
- Scott suggests whether it's possible to use the term identified access to a service.
- Andrew notes that they reference "classic kerberos" versus "modern kerberos"
- Denny notes that there's a section around usability, but how it looks on the screen and the user interface, is that something that is in the scope now? Andrew Hughes responds that they obtain usability from following the NSTIC guiding principles, which include usability. The idea being that authenticators that are difficult to use are not trusted.
- Ken notes that there are currently no normative usability requirements.
- RGW mentions the issue of uniqueness of credentials, and inconsistency in the use of the term "digital service" in the introduction to SP-800-63-B. Section 4 uses the term as if it refers to the Credential Service Provider, whereas the introductory text uses the term as if means the Relying Party.
- Section 4 is marked normative, so it should be clear about requirements, use shall statements for that.
- On guidance versus technical requirements. Richard observes that on the first page they should be referring to requirements rather than guidance. Calling it guidelines dilutes the force of the requirement. Andrew can observe that they are putting normative statements in the document but not using normative language. The documents are called "guidance" but it contains requirements. Are the contents mandatory or not?
- Andrew observes that a state model would be helpful to show how entities go from non-authenticated to authenticated state, verifiers in pre-authenticated to post-authenticated state. Scott concurs on the state model.
- Denny asks about if there's a model for them to reference. Andrew observes that 800-63-3 describes the model of the architecture for the discussion in the documents. There's a role diagram that infers some changes of state, it's indistinct but it illustrates that a claimant becomes a subscriber. Probably not complex, but not documented at this point. Denny wonders about disability acts in various parts of the world.
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- Additional comments from RGW - section 4.1.2 - cryptographic authenticators at AAL1 shall use approved cryptography. Scott suggests that this is in line with NIST's mission to push approved cryptography for all uses of government cryptography.
- Additional comment RGW - 4.1.4, 4.2.4, 4.3.4 there are references to 800-53 "or equivalent standard" but what is the method of judging what an equivalent standard is.
- Andrew has a comment on section 4.5 - summary of requirements, they don't have rows for records retention or privacy requirements.
Reference: IAWG Meeting Minutes 2017-03-09